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In the twenty years that the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) has been in existence, Parties to the Convention
continue to debate the issue of the inherent tension between
conservation and trade. This debate has been further com-
plicated by the advent of "sustainable use." At the 1992
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (held in Kyoto, Ja-
pan), a select group of countries challenged, under the guise
of sustainable use, the Convention's method for categorizing
species according to the relative risks of extinction they face
(the Berne Criteria). Parties charged that under the Berne
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knowledges the excellent work of the many associates and editors on the Pace
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made this paper possible.
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Criteria, species that could withstand international trade
were erroneously listed as endangered. Although unsuccess-
ful in their attempts to modify the Berne Criteria, sustaina-
ble use proponents succeeded in continuing the debate such
that the Berne Criteria will again be reviewed at the No-
vember 1994 Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to be
held in Florida. This comment analyzes the debate over
sustainable use of flora and fauna within CITES and ad-
dresses select resolutions adopted by the Parties to provide
for the sustainable use of species that are endangered or
threatened. The comment also focuses on the treatment of
the African elephant under CITES and also examines the
crocodilian trade as an example of the successes and fail-
ures of sustainable use.
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I. Introduction
Many species and their habitats are diminishing at an
incredible rate due to human consumption and habitat loss.
Now, more than ever, international cooperation is needed to
protect these species from extinction. However, the need for
species and habitat conservation conflicts at times with the
need for economic development, especially in those countries
where international trade in fauna and flora serves as a vital
source of income. One step taken to address this tension be-
tween conservation and trade is the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES),' currently an agreement between 120 member
states.2 However, since its inception in 1973, the purpose of
CITES remains unsettled. After decades of rampant wildlife
trade caused the extinction of numerous species and
threatened many more, CITES was drafted based on the
premise that "international cooperation is essential for the
protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against
1. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I-A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S.
243, [hereinafter CITES]. CITES is not the first international agreement on
wildlife protection. The Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preser-
vation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, was the first
international agreement which advocated both the protection of commercially
valuable wildlife and the conservation of all threatened species. See SARAH
FITZGERALD, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: WHOSE Busnmss Is IT? 11
(1990); SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 239 (1985).
2. Bill Tarrant, The Swiftlet Birds' Nests Get Saved From the Dinner Ta-
ble, Cm. TRm., Dec. 2, 1993, at C7.
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over-exploitation through international trade."3 In using the
words "over-exploitation," CITES recognizes that too much
international trade can be detrimental to a species. However,
the CITES language indicates that some "exploitation" will
be tolerated.
Thus, CITES seeks to balance the tension between the
needs for conservation and trade of these species by the Par-
ties to the Convention (Parties). However, the question re-
mains: Where does or should this balance lie? "Is CITES
designed to protect species or is it designed to promote con-
trolled trade that is not detrimental?"4 If the answer is the
latter, a second question follows: When is international trade
detrimental? CITES does not clearly answer these questions.
Diverging ideologies and economic interests exist be-
tween developed and underdeveloped countries, range states
and non-range states, 5 and government and non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs). 6 These differing interests lead in-
evitably to differing views over how CITES should be
interpreted and what its primary purpose should be.7 Thus
some view CITES as "an international endangered species
list, a trade agreement like any other, the world's premier
conservation treaty or, as is quite often the case, an endless
stream of costly and time-consuming paperwork."8
3. CITES, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis added).
4. Interview with Dorene Bolze, Policy Analyst, The Wildlife Conservation
Society, in Bronx, New York (Feb. 11, 1993).
5. Range states are generally those states in which a species lives or occu-
pies. However, CITES has yet to formally define what a range state is. Tele-
phone Interview with Dr. Ronald I. Orenstein, Canadian attorney and member
of the Species Survival Network (May 16, 1994). The Species Survival Network
is made up of North American environmental conservation organizations.
6. Absent objection by at least one-third of the Parties present, NGOs may
attend and participate at meetings of the Conference of the Parties. See CITES,
supra note 1, art. X, para. 7(b).
7. AmE BRAxTIGAM, CITES: A CONSERVATION TOOL iii (1991) (copies of
the booklet may be obtained by contacting IUCN/SSC Trade Specialist Group,
1725 DeSales St., NW, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036). The introduction
points out that "[wihile the treaty's diverse constituency inevitably accounts for
[a] broad range of viewpoints, there is little doubt that some of the debate and,
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CITES classifies species 9 of flora and fauna by placing
them in lists, called appendices, according to how endangered
each species is. Those "threatened with extinction" are listed
in Appendix I and commercial trade in those species is essen-
tially prohibited;10 those that are not as threatened are
placed in Appendix II and limited commercial trade in these
species is permitted.-' Appendix III pertains to species regu-
lated by a party within its borders and "require[s] the cooper-
ation of other parties in the control of trade."1 2
This classification system is the center of the CITES con-
troversy. There is considerable disagreement as to how spe-
cies are categorized, when commercial trade should be
permitted, and who should bear the burden of proof for
changing a species' categorization. Currently, species are
listed and/or removed from the appendices according to the
Berne Criteria, a listing of biological and trade factors agreed
to at the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (held
in Berne, Switzerland).13 However, their continued applica-
bility has been severely questioned and the advent of the the-
ory of sustainable use14 of fauna and flora further complicates
9. "'Species' means any species, subspecies, or geographically separate
population." CITES, supra note 1, art. I, para. a. This definition is very impor-
tant. One normally assumes that the word species applies to the "entire spe-
cies" as a whole; however, it does not. This classification scheme allows
different populations of species to be treated and protected differently. The is-
sue of split-listing, as it is referred to, is discussed later in this comment in
greater detail. See generally infra, Section V.
10. CITES, supra note 1, art. II, para. 1.
11. Id. art. II, para. 2.
12. Id. art. II, para. 3. "Appendix III shall include all species which any
Party identified as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the cooperation of
other parties in the control of trade." Id.
13. Criteria for the Addition of Species and Other Taxa to Appendices I and
II and for the Transfer of Species and Other Taxa from Appendix II to Appendix
I, CITES, 1st mtg., Conf. 1.1 (Berne, 1976) in BRAUTiGAM, supra note 7, at 44-45
[hereinafter Conf. 1.1]; Criteria for the Deletion of Species and Other Taxa from
Appendix I and Appendix II, CITES, 1st mtg., Conf. 1.2 (Berne, 1976) in BRAU-
TIGAM, supra note 7, at 46-47 [hereinafter Conf. 1.2]. Although Conf. 1.1 and
Conf. 1.2 are separate resolutions, with Conf. 1.1 pertaining to the addition and
transfer of species and other taxa and Conf. 1.2 to the deleting of species and
other taxa, the "Berne Criteria" refer to both resolutions.




During the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Par-
ties (held in Kyoto, Japan), Botswana, Malawi, Namibia,
Zambia and Zimbabwe introduced a series of resolutions (the
Zimbabwe Resolutions) that, among other things, sought to
replace the Berne Criteria: these proposals promoted sus-
tainable use of wildlife as a viable means of conservation and
economic development, challenging the basic principles upon
which CITES was founded.15
The Zimbabwe Resolutions did not receive wide approval
by the Parties; most were either withdrawn by their sponsors
in committee or were redrafted into less controversial resolu-
tions. However, the authors of the Zimbabwe Resolutions did
achieve their goal of promoting debate over the continued use
of the Berne Criteria. 16 The Parties agreed that the Berne
Criteria needed review, and a special committee was formed
to devise new listing criteria to be presented at the Ninth
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (to be held in Florida
in November 1994).17
This comment explores the conflicting views over the
purpose of CITES, the inherent conflict between trade and
conservation, and the role of sustainable use of fauna and
flora within the CITES framework. CITES text and subse-
quent resolutions fully support the concept of sustainable use
tern at a rate within its capacity for renewal and in a manner compatible with
conservation of the diversity and long term viability of the resource and its sup-
porting ecosystems." IUCN/SSC Specialist Group on Sustainable Use of Wild
Species, Criteria and Requirements for Sustainable Use of Wild Species, Pro-
posed Policy, Second Draft, para. 13, (July 15, 1992) (unpublished document
available from IUCN) [hereinafter IUCN/SSC Draft Sustainable Use Policy].
15. See generally infra Section V. Following the Convention, one commen-
tator wrote that "the conservation rift between anti-trade interests and sustain-
able-use advocates appeared wider than ever." See Ginette Hemley, CITES
1992: Endangered Treaty?, TRAFFIC (U.SA.), Aug. 1992 at 1 [hereinafter,
Hemley, Endangered Treaty].
16. While the Parties in Kyoto recognized that trade based on sustainable
use could be beneficial to wildlife, they refused to adopt a universal criteria for
categorizing species that failed to take into account the potential detrimental
effects of international trade. Recognition of the Benefits of Trade in Wildlife,
CITES, 8th mtg., Conf. 8.3 (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Conf. 8.3].
17. Development of New Criteria for Amendment to the Appendices, CITES,
8th mtg., Conf. 8.20 (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Conf. 8.20].
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but resolutions to CITES regarding the amendments to Ap-
pendix I or II rightfully treat international commercial trade
of fauna and flora as suspect, requiring a high standard be
met to assure that trade is conducted in a sustainable man-
ner. If sustainable use of flora and fauna is to function under
the CITES system, the Parties must improve their manage-
ment practices and Convention enforcement. The prospects
for combating illegal trade in flora and fauna seem highly un-
certain given the tremendous economic pressures driving
trade and the lack of funding and political will at a national
and international level to improve CITES implementation
and enforcement. Given the inability and at times unwilling-
ness of the Parties to implement and enforce CITES, sustain-
able commercial international trade of fauna and flora, even
with high standards, will remain an elusive goal. The Parties
will have few options but to ban the international trade of
some species to ensure their survival.
This comment is divided into five main parts. Section II
analyzes CITES' text, examines the requirements and the
burden of proof required for including, transferring or delet-
ing a species in or from CITES' Appendix I or Appendix II
(the Berne Criteria),18 and the Convention's acceptance of the
"precautionary principle." Section III provides a brief over-
view of the concept of sustainable use, its means as a conser-
vation tool and the difficulties at arriving at a definition
acceptable to all.
Finally, section IV addresses subsequent CITES resolu-
tions that modify and create exceptions to the Berne Criteria.
The willingness of the Parties to allow for the commercial
sustainable use of species listed in Appendix I and their flexi-
bility in addressing the inherent conflict between trade and
conservation are demonstrated. Section V analyzes the
Zimbabwe Resolutions submitted at the 1992 Conference of
the Parties in Kyoto, Japan and their attempt to amend
CITES in the name of sustainable use. The numerous con-
flicts between the resolutions and CITES and the assump-
tions upon which the proposed resolutions were based are
18. Conf. 1.1, supra note 13, at 44-45; Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46-47.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
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highlighted. This section also reviews the debate over down-
listing select populations of the African elephant and the dif-
ferent factors considered by the Parties when determining
whether to split-list species between two different
appendices.
Section VI looks at the future of sustainable use of fauna
and flora within CITES and explores some problems encoun-
tered in its implementation, particularly in a commercial in-
ternational trade context. The requirements necessary to
implement sustainable use - accurate data and strong trade
controls are examined - and some of its limitations as a con-
servation tool are revealed.
II. A Description of CITES and Its Principles
A. The Convention
CITES' principal function is to protect endangered "spe-
cies of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through
international trade."19 CITES recognizes "that wild flora and
fauna in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irre-
placeable part of the natural systems of the earth which must
be protected for this and the generations to come."20 While
CITES addresses only international fauna and flora trade, it
acknowledges that wild fauna and flora possess "aesthetic,
scientific, cultural, recreational and economic" values. 21
Although the value most often given species in international
commercial trade is economic, CITES does not favor one par-
ticular value over another. 22 Species which may be affected
by international trade are assigned by the Parties to one of
three appendices ranked according to the threat to each spe-
cies 23 and are subject to an import and export permit
system.24
19. CITES, supra note 1, pmbl.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. art. H.; See, e.g., William C. Burns, CITES and the Regulation of
International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora: A Critical Appraisal, 8
Dacy J. ILr'L L. 203, 208-10 (1990).
24. See generally Laura H. Kosloff and Mark C. Trexler, The Convention on
1994] 309
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Species "threatened with extinction which are or may be
affected by trade" are listed in Appendix I and may be traded
internationally only in exceptional circumstances. 25 Appen-
dix I species may only be traded for non-commercial purposes
and only if both the importing and exporting countries issue
permits indicating that the transaction will "not [be] detri-
mental to the survival of the species involved" and the ship-
ment (if carrying live specimens) will be conducted in a
manner that will not result in injury or cruel treatment.26
Appendix II lists "all species which although not neces-
sarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless
trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regula-
tion in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their sur-
vival."27 Unlike Appendix I, Appendix II species may be
traded for commercial purposes if the export country provides
a permit indicating that (1) the species was obtained legally
and (2) its "export will not be detrimental to the survival of
that species."28 To ensure the effective control of threatened
species that might be undermined by the trade in look-alike
species, species which are similar in appearance to other
threatened species may also be placed in Appendix II, regard-
less of whether the look-alike species is in danger.29 Appen-
dix III pertains to species regulated by a party within its
International Trade in Endangered Species: Enforcement Theory and Practice
in the United States, 5 B.U. I'L L.J. 327 (1987).
.25. CITES, supra note 1, art. II, para. 1. Thus, even if a threatened species
is not subject to "over-exploitation through international trade," it may still be
protected by Appendix I if it "may be affected by trade." Id. pmbl., art. H, para.
1.
26. Id. art. III, paras. 3(a), (b), (c). See DORENE BoLzE, WILDLIFE CONSERVA-
TION INTERNATIONAL, THE WILD Brad TRADE: WHEN A BIRD IN THE HAND MEANS
NONE i THE BUsH, 10 (1992). According to the Policy Report by Wildlife Con-
servation International (WCI), at least sixty percent of birds captured in the
wild for legal trade die before reaching their final destination. Id. at 8.
27. CITES, supra note 1, art. II, para. 2(a) (emphasis added). Article I de-
fined "specimen" as "any animal or plant, whether alive or dead... [and] any
readily recognizable part or derivative thereof." Id. art. I, paras. (b)(i), (ii).
28. Id. art. IV, para. 2(a).
29. Id. art. II, para. 2(b). Appendix II shall include: "(b) other species
which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in specimens of certain
species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought
under effective control." Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
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borders and requires "the cooperation of other parties in the
control of trade."30 The Parties may move a species from one
appendix to another through adoption of an amendment by a
two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting at
the bi-annual Conference. 31
Since CITES does not possess any regulatory powers of
its own, the Parties are responsible for passing national laws
and regulations implementing CITES' provisions and for en-
suring that it is enforced.3 2 Each Party must establish Man-
agement and Scientific Authorities to grant and monitor
export and re-export permits and ensure that exports are not
"detrimental to the survival" of a species.3 3 In theory, the
30. Id. art. I1, para. 3.
31. Id. art. XV, para. 2.
32. CITES, supra note 1, art. VIII.
1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the pro-
visions of the present Convention and to prohibit trade in speci-
mens in violation thereof. These shall include measures:
(a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both;
and
(b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export
of such specimens.
Id. art. VIH, para. 1. In addition, CITES' preamble recognizes "that peoples
and States are and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna and
flora." Id. pmbl.
33. Id. art. III, para. 2(a). The duties and powers of the Management and
Scientific Authorities are outlined in Articles I through MC. Article VIII sets
forth the measures to be taken by the Parties to enforce the Convention. Par-
ties may "penalize" those involved in illegal trade and confiscate any illegal
specimens. Id. art. VIII, paras. 1(a), (b). Live specimens confiscated by a State
must be returned to the State of export with notice and at its expense. Id. art.
VIII, paras. 4(a), (b). In addition, the Parties must "maintain records of trade in
specimens of species included in Appendices I, 1, and III," Id. art. VIII, para. 6,
and submit annual and bi-annual reports to the CITES Secretariat docu-
menting trade information and efforts taken to effectively enforce CITES' provi-
sions. Id. art. VIII, para. 7. If one of the Parties fails to meet its obligations,
the Secretariat may recommend to the Parties that some form of remedial ac-
tion be taken. Id. art. XII, para. 2(h).
'The functions of the Secretariat shall be:... to make recommendations for
the implementation of the aims and provisions of the present Convention." Id.
Appointed by the United Nations Environmental Programme, the Secretariat is
a central figure uniting the Parties involved in the continuous CITES debates.
Id. art. XII, para. 2. The Secretariat arranges for the meetings of the Parties
and studies and prepares the Parties' reports, highlighting the pertinent CITES
matters. Id. Furthermore, the Secretariat publishes and distributes the ap-
pendices editions. Id. art. XVII, para. 2(f). The Secretariat also accepts pro-
1994] 311
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Scientific Authority plays an important role in implementing
CITES. It must monitor export permits and determine
whether the export of a "species should be limited in order to
maintain that species throughout its range at a level consis-
tent with its role in the ecosystems in which it occurs and
well above the level at which that species might become eligi-
ble for inclusion in Appendix I."34
B. The Berne Criteria & the "Precautionary Principle"
Although CITES was ratified in 1975, the criteria used to
list in or remove a species from Appendix I or II (the Berne
Criteria) were not adopted until 1976 at the First Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties (held in Berne, Switzerland).3 5
In determining the appendix in which a species should be
listed, neither CITES nor the Berne Criteria provide any con-
crete gauge on which to base a decision.3 6 For inclusion in
Appendix I, for example, CITES and the Berne Criteria
(Conf. 1.1) require that a species be "threatened with extinc-
tion,"37 but the words "threatened" and "extinction" are not
defined. Disagreement over what actually constitutes
"threatened with extinction" under CITES is a source of fric-
tion among the Parties.
In an attempt to define or at least categorize "threatened
with extinction" the Berne Criteria use a combination of bio-
posed amendments which he or she later communicates to the other Parties.
Id. art. XV, para. 1(a).
34. Id. art. IV, para. 3.
35. DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES 32
(1989) [hereinafter FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE]. See Conf. 1.1, supra note 13,
at 44-45; Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46-47.
36. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 32; Letter from Dr.
Ronald I. Orenstein, International Wildlife Coalition, on behalf of the NGO
Working Group on CITES Revision Criteria, to Dr. John G. Robinson, Director,
Wildlife Conservation International (Oct. 2, 1992) and accompanying report;
Dr. Ronald I. Orenstein et al, CITES and the Revision of the Berne Criteria
(Oct. 1992) (unpublished material on file with the Pace Environmental Law Re-
view) [hereinafter Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria].
37. CITES, supra note 1, art. II, para. 1; Conf. 1.1, supra note 13, at 44
(emphasis added). Determining that a species is threatened with extinction de-
pends on the rate of species' decline and the potential for its extinction. Feb. 11,
1993 Bolze Interview, supra note 4.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
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logical3 and trade factors3 9 as guidelines for determining in
which appendix a species should be listed.40 This system al-
lows for flexibility in listing41 and permits the Conference of
the Parties to consider the unique factors affecting each spe-
cies.42 Some believe that "listing decisions were clearly in-
tended by the signers to include a political, or at least a
diplomatic, component. The listing process was never in-
tended to be an 'impartial' or strictly 'scientific' one."43 How-
ever, this flexibility also results in greater controversy
38. Conf. 1.1, supra note 13, at 44. The following factors should be consid-
ered in determining the biological status of species and other taxa for purposes
of adding or transferring the species or taxa to Appendix I:
Information of any of the following types should be required in or-
der of preference: a) scientific reports on the population size or geo-
graphic range of the species over a number of years b) scientific
reports on the population size or geographic range of species based
on single surveys c) reports by reliable observers other than scien-
tists on population size or geographic range of the species over a
number of years or d) reports from various sources on habitat de-
struction, heavy trade or other potential causes of extinction. Gen-
era should be listed if most of their species are threatened with
extinction and if identification of individual species within the ge-
nus is difficult.
Id.
39. Id. The following factors should be considered in determining the trade
status of species and other taxa for purposes of adding or transferring the spe-
cies or taxa to Appendix I:
Particular attention should be given to any species for which such
trade might, over a period of time, involve numbers of specimens
constituting a significant portion of the total population size neces-
sary for the continued survival of the species. The biological status
and trade status of a species are obviously related. When biological
data show a species to be declining seriously, there need only be a
probability of trade. When trade is known to occur, information on
the biological status need not be as complete. This principle espe-
cially applies to groups of related species, where trade can readily
shift from one species that is well-known to another for which there
is little biological information.
Id.
40. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 2. "The
Berne Criteria are not definitional criteria at all; their main finction is to spec-
ify what sort of information should guide the parties in making their decisions."
Id. at 2.
41. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 34.
42. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 2, 9.
43. Id. at 2. Dr. Orenstein views this as a strength. He questions, for ex-
ample, whether "biological criteria could have been used, in the mid 1960's, to
13
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because the process is inherently subjective and ultimately
relies on a Party's values, interests and policies in reaching a
decision.
Some consider the process for removal of a species from
Appendix I to be even more controversial because when delet-
ing or transferring a species from Appendix I, the Berne Cri-
teria require that a Party meet a heavier burden of scientific
proof that a species can withstand a lesser degree of protec-
tion than is needed to justify listing the species in Appendix I
initially.44 Conf. 1.2 explains why greater caution is needed
when deleting a species or taxa from Appendix I or Appendix
II or when transferring a species or taxa from Appendix I to
II:
The addition to and deletion from the appendices [are]
different problems requiring different approaches by the
Conference. If an error is made by the Conference by un-
necessarily placing a plant or animal on an appendix, the
result is the imposition of a documentation requirement. If
however, it errs in prematurely removing a plant or animal
from protection, or lowering the level of protection af-
forded, the result can be the permanent loss of the re-
source. If it errs it should be therefore toward protection of
the resource.4 5
That the Berne Criteria view trade as suspect is further
predict that the black rhinoceros was in greater danger of extinction than the
white rhinoceros." Id. at 9.
44. Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46 states:
Criteria for deletion, or transfer from Appendix I to Appendix
I1, should require positive scientific evidence that the plant or
animal can withstand the exploitation resulting from the removal
of protection. This evidence must transcend informal or lay evi-
dence of changing biological status and any evidence of commercial
trade which may have been sufficient to require the animal or plant
to be placed on an appendix initially. Such evidence should include
at least a well documented population survey, an indication of the
population trend of the species, showing recovery sufficient to jus-
tify deletion, and an analysis of the potential for commercial trade
in the species of population.
Id.; See also David S. Favre, Tension Points Within the Language of the CITES
Treaty, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 247, 253 (1987) [hereinafter Favre, Tension Points].
45. Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46 (emphasis added).
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evidenced by the fact that when adding a species to Appendix
I the biological status of the species "need not be as complete"
if "trade is known to occur."46 However, the biological status
required for removing a species from Appendix I must be sup-
ported by "positive scientific evidence that the plant or
animal can withstand the exploitation .... ."47 This higher
standard for removing species from appendices48 is an exam-
ple of the "precautionary principle," which is also exhibited in
the Convention preamble.49
According to David Favre, professor at Detroit College of
Law and a CITES specialist, "[tlhe precautionary principle
represents the realization that human activities impacting
the natural environment often have negative consequences
which can not be fully predictable or provable in advance of
action."50 In its application "the precautionary principle sug-
gests that an action should not be undertaken if it poses an
unknown risk, if not a certainty, of harm."51 The precaution-
ary principle places the burden of proof on those wishing to
undertake an action to prove that it will not harm the
environment.52
This approach has been highly controversial. Critics of
the Berne Criteria contend that "CITES has become a vehi-
cle, not for regulating the wildlife trade, but for stopping the
use of wildlife altogether."5 3 Both range states and consumer
states which rely on the commercial trade of fauna or flora
have vested economic interests in seeing a species removed
from Appendix I so that they may continue to benefit from its
commercial trade. Logically, those with commercial trade in-
terests will have a different view of when a species is or con-
46. Conf. 1.1, supra note 13, at 44.
47. Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46.
48. Id.
49. CITES, supra note 1, pmbl.; Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria,
supra note 36, at 4.
50. David S. Favre, A Precautionary Tale 6 (Sept. 18, 1993) (unpublished
document on file at the Pace Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter, Favre,
Precautionary Tale].
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id.
53. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 5.
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tinues to be "threatened with extinction," than those that rely
upon a species for its non-consumptive use (eco-tourism, for
example).
The number of species added to CITES appendices or
uplisted from one appendix to another has exceeded the
number of species removed or downlisted. 54 While some may
hold this as proof that CITES is an obstruction to commercial
wildlife use, it may be that this result "has far more to do
with an increase in wildlife trade affecting many more species
and an increase in our knowledge of the effects of that trade,
than to the structure of the Berne Criteria."55
III. Understanding the Debate Over Sustainable Use
"Sustainability" has become a household word among the
environmental and development community. Many have ar-
ticulated the need for sustainable development and use of
natural resources. 56 Yet reference to "sustainable use" is
sometimes made without a full understanding of its true
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. The Parties later recognized that many initial species listings in
appendices occurred "with little or no information," Special Criteria for the De-
letion of Species and Other Taxa Included in Appendix I or II Without Applica-
tion of the Berne Criteria for Addition, CITES, 2d mtg., Conf. 2.23 (San Jos,
1979) in BRAUTmGAM, supra note 7, at 62 [hereinafter Conf. 2.23], without re-
gard to the Berne Criteria and many countries of origin were not given an op-
portunity to comment on the listing of species. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
supra note 35, at 49. Since some species were listed with "less than the level of
proof required," Parties felt it was unfair to subject these species to the Berne
Criteria. Id. at 48-49; Conf. 2.23 supra this note, at 62.
In an attempt to ease the stringent downlisting requirements while main-
taining scientific validity, the Parties approved separate delisting criteria for all
species listed "during or before the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties
.... " Conf. 2.23 supra this note, at 62. Instead of meeting the scientific re-
quirements of the Berne Criteria, the Parties need only show that "a careful
review of all available information" indicates that the species does not warrant
its retention in the appendix. Id. at 62-63. The Parties still must vote on the
downlisting, removal or addition of the species. CITES, supra note 1, art. XI,
para. 3(b) (Parties may "consider and adopt amendments to Appendices I and H
in accordance with Article XV."). Factors such as enforcement and the effect of
international trade must still be considered. See, e.g., Conf. 1.1, supra note 13,
at 44; Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46.
56. See, e.g., IUCN/SSC Draft Sustainable Use Policy, supra note 14, para.
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meaning, partly because its definition is not entirely settled.
In theory, sustainable use is not overly controversial: Natu-
ral resources should be used "at a rate within their capacity
for renewal."57 Over the past 30 years the understanding of
sustainable use has changed.58 As IUCN notes:
In the days when 'maximum sustainable yield' was the ob-
jective of fisheries and game management, it was consid-
ered appropriate for harvest levels to be set to provide the
highest yield of the desired product indefinitely. The im-
pact of such harvest levels on the genetic diversity of the
harvested population, on other species or on associated
ecosystems was generally ignored. This is no longer con-
sidered acceptable practice.59
The controversy over sustainable use lies primarily with
its application and its use as a conservation tool. The debate
over sustainable use of fauna and flora as a means of conser-
vation focuses largely on three issues: (1) which uses will fur-
ther conservation,60 (2) is a particular use sustainable, and
(3) "who should bear the burden of proof in the absence of full
information about a species."61
57. John G. Robinson, The Limits to Caring: Sustainable Living and the
Loss ofBiodiversity, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Mar. 1993, at 20, 23. The require-
ment for ecological sustainability according to Robinson "is that harvest from
the population must not exceed the potential yield. Yield is total production
subtracting natural mortality." Id.
58. IUCN/SSC Draft Sustainable Use Policy, supra note 14, para. 12.
59. Id.
60. John G. Robinson & Kent H. Redford, The Use and Conservation of
Wildlife, in NEoTRoPICAL WILDLIFE USE AND CONSERVATION 3 (John G. Robin-
son & Kent H. Redford eds., 1991).
61. Favre, Precautionary Tale, supra note 50, at 11. In a special report on
Using Wildlife Wisely, IUCN posed the following questions regarding the sus-
tainable use of wildlife:
1. Is wildlife unitization ethically justifiable?
2. Is wildlife use really compatible with conservation?
3. Can wildlife use projects be justified if they compete with tradi-
tional activities like farming?
4. What makes a sustainable use project successful?
5. What standards should IUCN apply when setting up a project?
Steve Edwards, Sustainable Wildlife Use, IUCN BuLLErTriN, Dec. 1990, at 13.
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A. Valuing Species
Sustainable use as a conservation tool centers around
ascribing value to species. 62 Robinson and Redford, editors of
the book Neotropical Wildlife Use and Conservation, contend
"that unless wildlife has some use to people, then wildlife will
not be valued by people. If wildlife has no value, then wildlife
and its habitat will be destroyed to make way for other land
uses...."63
While we tend to "equate value with use,.., not all value
can be measured using economic indices."64 People may
value species for "commercial, recreational, scientific, aes-
thetic, or spiritual reasons."65 Recognizing (as does CITES)
that fauna and flora possess many different values, IUCN
lists three different approaches to "determining the value of
biological resources:"66
[11 assessing the value of the nature's products - such
as firewood, fodder, and game meat - that are consumed
directly, without passing through a market ("consumptive
use value");
[21 assessing the value of products which are commer-
cially harvested, such as game meat sold in a market, tim-
62. See Favre, Precautionary Tale, supra note 50.
63. Robinson & Redford, supra note 60, at 3. However, Favre disputes the
notion "that human domination of all the species on earth is ethically accepta-
ble." Favre, Precautionary Tale, supra note 50, at 12.
Even if a use is sustainable, I do not accept the premise that the
highest use of wildlife is as commodities for human use. Wildlife
are not commercial products of human enterprize [sic], but are our
neighbors on this incredible diverse, but ultimately limited planet.
There is an ethical perspective that ought to guide human decisions
in this very important area of human actions. We are sharing the
earth with millions of other creatures. Just because we have the
power to consume and destroy millions of animals [and plants] does
not mean that it is ethically justifiable. All living things have an
interest in continuing their natural life. Our management deci-
sions about human activities should seek the maximum protection
for our coinhabitants of the planet.
Id.
64. Robinson & Redford, supra note 60, at 4.
65. Id. at 3.




ber, fish, ivory, and medicinal plants ("productive use
value");
[3] and assessing indirect values of ecosystem functions,
such as watershed protection, photosynthesis, regulation
of climate, and production of soil ("non-consumptive use
value"), along with the intangible values of keeping opera-
tions open for the future and simply knowing that certain
species exist ("option value" and "existence value",
respectively).6 7
Thus, the value that people assign fauna and flora may be
"productive," "consumptive," or "non-consumptive,"68 and is
not limited to just economic value. However, the value most
often assigned in international trade is economic and some
sustainable use advocates argue that this is necessary to as-
sure a species' conservation. Critics of contemporary conser-
vation measures argue that efforts by nations to halt the loss
of wildlife and biodiversity through the use of "trade restric-
tions" have had at best mixed results. 6 9
[[If property rights and incentives for private sector man-
agement and maintenance of species and their habitat are
established, then trade in wild species, either wild or cap-
tively reared, can contribute to conservation. If the wild-
life and habitat have a marketable value, landowners or
lessees vested with enforceable property rights have an in-
centive to nurture and protect these resources.70
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Jon H. Goldstein, The Prospects For Using Market Incentives to
Conserve Biological Diversity, 21 ENrTL. L. REP. 985 (1991). Mr. Goldstein is an
Economist at the Office of Program Analysis, United States Department of the
Interior.
70. Id. at 989. But see Valerius Geist, Wildlife Conservation as Wealth, 368
NATURE 491 (Apr. 7, 1994). Geist contends that: "[wlildlife conservation is in-
compatible with global markets or private ownership. What is needed is a 'tri-
bal' system of management such as that in North America that creates both
wealth and jobs while sustaining resources." Id. See also JOHN THoRB iA I-
SON, IUCN/SSC CROCODIE SPECIALIST GROUP, CROCODILES, AN ACTION PLAN TO
THEm CONSERVATION 4 (Harry Messel et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
THORBJARNARSON, ACTION PLAN]. 'The reality of the situation in the developing
world is that wildlife is competing with mankind for limited resources. Denying
wildlife a commercial value denies it the opportunity to compete successfully
1994] 319
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Others agree that economic considerations can play an
important role in the conservation of biological resources, but
contend that such resources "need to be judged in economic
terms which consider both market and non-market values."7 1
While people must assign some value or use to natural re-
sources to effectively compete with other land uses, there are
important differences between promoting the use of wildlife
as a means of conservation and the economic use of wildlife as
grounds for its conservation:72
Accepting use as a means to conserve wildlife is not the
same as providing economic justifications for conserving
wildlife.... To the extent that the use of wildlife brings
animals or their products into the marketplace, wildlife
will also have economic value. But economic value does not
supersede other values; it augments them. Debates over
the assignment of value to wildlife frequently confuse the
terms use, value and commerce. While it follows that if
wildlife is used for some purpose it will have value, it does
not follow that value will be economic value, or that once
wildlife enters the commercial world, decisions concerning
conservation must be based solely on economic considera-
tions. Value cannot be completely described in economic
terms. Value transcends economics. 73
B. Determining When a Use is Sustainable
Determining what use provides the best incentive for the
conservation of a species is just one issue surrounding the
concept of sustainable use. A second issue focuses on the
problems associated with determining when in fact a particu-
lar use is sustainable.
Ecological sustainability must be distinguished from so-
cioeconomic sustainability. The sustainable use concept is
with alternative land use practices such as agriculture." Id. (citations
omitted).
71. McNeely, supra note 66, at 4. McNeely also points out that "simplistic
attempts to put a price tag on nature are hampered by the reality that market
values can change suddenly and unexpectedly." Id.
72. Robinson & Redford, supra note 60, at 3-4.
73. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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based on the notion that "resources are renewable," and "that
people can balance their consumption with resource produc-
tion."7 4 However, people tend to have "a popular misunder-
standing of natural systems - that they exist at equilibrium,
and that there is a 'balance of nature,'" which is not always
the case.75 For example, not all species occur in high enough
densities to be sustainably used.76 In addition, the removal
of a species has ramifications on the biological community
from which it is taken.77
During the 1994 General Assembly of the International
Union of Conservation and Nature (IUCN) in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, the IUCN Draft Guidelines for the Ecological Sus-
tainability of Non-Consumptive and Consumptive Use of
Wild Species (Draft Guidelines) were proposed.78 According
to the Draft Guidelines, the "use of a wild species is likely to
be sustainable if."
a. it does not reduce the future use potential of the
target population or impair its long term viability;
b. it is compatible with maintenance of the long
74. Robinson, supra note 57, at 23.
75. Id. (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 24. Robinson explains that "[t]he extent to which a species can be
harvested or used by humans depends in large part on whether it exhibits den-
sity compensation .... Use is ... much more feasible when people are exploit-
ing species that show strong density compensation and have high rates of
renewability." Id. Such species tend to be found in ecosystems which are "at
younger successional stages" while species with minimal density compensation
tend to be found in more mature and "high diversity ecosystems" such as tropi-
cal forests which are more difficult to exploit. Id.
77. Id. at 21, 23. Robinson notes that "while improving the quality of life,
we will inevitably decrease the diversity of life." Id. at 21.
78. See IUCN - Tim WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
WORKSHOP 3: SUSTAINABLE USE OF LIVING NATURAL RESOURCES, DRAFT GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE ECOLOGICAL SUSTAiNABILrrY OF NoN-CoNsumiFrVE AND CON-
SUMPTIVE USES OF WILD SPECIES, para. 18 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter DRAFT
GUIDELINES]. According to Boize, who attended the Conference and the ses-
sions on the Draft Guidelines, conservationists criticized the document. Inter-
view with Dorene Bolze, Policy Analyst, The Wildlife Conservation Society, in
Bronx, New York (Mar. 4, 1994). Sustainable use advocates also opposed the
Draft because they believed it was too stringent and that ultimately, if passed,
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term viability of supporting and dependent
ecosystems;
c. it does not reduce the future use potential or im-
pair long term viability of other species.7 9
In applying the precautionary principle to the concept of sus-
tainable use, the Draft Guidelines note that:
The precautionary principle requires approaching
questions of sustainability of use with the commitment to
act in the way least likely to impair the viability of the spe-
cies or the integrity of the ecosystem affected. This may
result in decisions not to use. This precautionary principle
is especially important when estimating sustainable use
levels.80
The members elected not to adopt the Draft Guidelines but to
test and revise them with the assistance of the IUCN mem-
bership for presentation at the next General Assembly.81
This definition of sustainable use focuses solely on the
ecological requirements necessary for the sustainable use of
wild species and addresses both the effects a use will have on
the target population and the effects on the supporting
ecosystem and other species. However, these ecosystem ef-
fects are difficult to predict or assess.
Robinson contends that it is impossible to speak of "eco-
logical sustainability" without also incorporating the concepts
of "socioeconomic sustainability" as well.82 He defines socio-
79. DRAFt GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at para. 18.
80. Id. at para. 49 (emphasis added). The Draft Guidelines add that "use
levels should always be cautious and well within the calculated capacity of the
target populations and its supporting ecosystems. Target populations and sup-
porting ecosystems may need to be safeguarded by management regimes that
include the designation of protected areas." Id.
81. IUCN - THE WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, 19TH SESSION OF THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY, SUSTAINABILITY OF NONCoNSumirIE AND CONSUMPTIVE USES
OF WIn SPECIES (1994). The resolution noted "that the development of guide-
lines for ecologically sustainable use does not imply, where existing range State
legislation sets an effective standard of protection for a specific wild species
within that State, that such protection should be removed." Id.
82. Robinson, supra note 57, at 23-26. In order to fully understand sustain-
able use, Robinson claims that three interdependent questions must be asked:
(1) "What will be the impact of human use on the environment or the biological
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
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economic sustainable activities "as those that meet the eco-
nomic needs and aspirations of the human users."83
However, not all users possess the same needs.
Most discussions of sustainable use assume that it is in the
interest [ ] of all social groups that resource use be sustain-
able. This is frequently not the case.... Sustainable use
only occurs when the rights of different user groups are
specified, when human needs are met, and when the losses
in biodiversity and environmental degradation are
acceptable.84
Without even addressing the practical issues associated with
its implementation, it is evident that sustainable use is an
elusive concept which is difficult to define.
IV. Balancing the Trade/Conservation Tension:
Sustainable Use & the Different Methods for
Downlisting or Transferring Species From
Appendix I to Appendix II
Although the text of the Convention never actually men-
tions the words "sustainable use," CITES does adhere to this
resource?;" (2) "What are the needs and aspirations of resource users?;" and (3)
" MWhat are the rights of different user groups to the resource?" Id. at 23 (em-
phasis added).
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. Robinson notes the Brazilian rubber tappers as an example:
[T]he decision, at the national level, to create rubber "extractive
reserves" in western Brazil - areas managed by local communities
and reserved for specific resource extraction - is commonly
trumpeted as a successful approach to sustainable resource use.
But the applicability of this approach depends on the political
power of the rubber tappers union, the interests of the local cattle
ranchers, the market demand for their products, the ability of local
communities to get their products to the market, to name a few con-
siderations. The international political and economic structures
will also have an impact on the long-term viability of such extrac-
tive endeavors. Until these influences are understood, it is unclear
whether a resource use will be socioeconomically sustainable. In
isolation, a local community might be able to meet their socioeco-
nomic needs, but when national or international politics or markets
are considered, they might be unable to do so.
1994] 323
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principle. The CITES drafters were not solely concerned with
the mere "survival" of a species, but were also concerned with
maintaining a species "at a level consistent with its role in
the ecosystem"8 5 - a concept consistent with the notion of
sustainable use.8 6 A subsequent resolution adopted by the
Parties (Conf. 2.6) entrusts importing nations with the re-
sponsibility of assuring that international trade is not detri-
mental to a species' survival.8 7
However, CITES ultimately defers the question of sus-
tainable use and conservation to the Parties, premised on the
theory "that peoples and States are and should be the best
protectors of their own wild fauna and flora."8 CITES is not
85. CITES, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 3.
86. See CITES, supra note 1, art. I, paras. 2(a), (3)(a), (3)(c), (5)(a), art. IV,
paras. 2(a), (3), (6)(a). CITES' use of the words "survival" and "maintenance" of
species raises the question: What is CITES' actual objective? The wording of
CITES is not clear. Nevertheless, what constitutes "survival" and maintenance
of a species "consistent with its role in the ecosystem[ I," Id. art. IV, para. 3,
are subjective criteria which provides ample room for differing interpretations.
[T]he term 'survival' is subject to a wide range of pragmatic and
theoretical definitions. The domestic legislation of the United
States protecting endangered species specifically states as a goal of
the federal law, the elimination of the species from the protected
list; in other words, to re-establish its population and habitat at
levels where special protection is no longer needed. CITES seeks to
assure the survival of species at a level allowing international trade
while assuring its viable role in the local ecosystem. Beyond estab-
lishing that minimum level, the goals of the Treaty are unclear.
FAvRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 40-41. For example, a species'
role in the ecosystem may once have been expansive, but, for some reason, its
numbers may have diminished over time due to habitat loss or species deple-
tion. If the species is still not threatened with extinction, what then is its role
in the ecosystem? Is it the species' present role as a diminished factor in the
ecosystem used to determine its "survival" or the species' former role when its
population was larger? The only guidance provided by CITES on these ques-
tions is that the Parties maintain a species at a level that does not allow it to
become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I. CITES, supra note 1, art. IV, para.
3.
87. Trade in Appendix II and III Species, CITES, 2d mtg., Conf. 2.6 (San
Jos6, 1979) in BRAuTirGm, supra note 7, at 50-51 [hereinafter Conf. 2.6]. Conf.
2.6 recommends that importing countries consult with exporting countries or
the Secretariat and "apply stricter domestic measures" when it "deems that an
Appendix II or I species is being traded in a manner detrimental to ... [its]
survival." Id.
88. CITES, supra note 1, pmbl.
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a comprehensive conservation treaty; it does not address
many issues pertaining to fauna and flora.8 9 For example,
CITES does not address the issue of habitat loss, commonly
recognized as a principal threat to fauna and flora in addition
to human consumption and trade.90 From CITES' perspec-
tive, the use of a species only becomes an issue when a Party
engages in its international trade.
The Berne Criteria assume that international trade will
have a detrimental effect on a species since trade normally
requires killing or removing a species from its natural
habitat.9 1 However, the advent of sustainable use has cre-
ated somewhat of a paradox. Trade can have a detrimental
effect upon a species; yet it has the potential to be beneficial
when conducted in a sustainable manner and when monies
derived from international trade are allocated for conserva-
tion and/or enforcement purposes, or for local rural communi-
ties; however, arriving at a balance between commercial
trade and species preservation is not easy.92
89. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 24, at 327. "At its best, CITES only regu-
lates international trade. Domestic trade, even if its effects are felt internation-
ally, is not addressed. Moreover, domestic activities that indirectly jeopardize
endangered species, through habitat destruction, exotic species introduction,
pesticide application, waste disposal, or otherwise, are also not covered by
CITES." Id. at 336.
90. Id. at 337, n. 44, citing NoRMAN MYERS, THE Sn~ING ARK 57 (1979), and
P. EHRLICH & A. EHRELICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 53 (1981).
91. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 34.
92. The Crocodile Specialist Group (CSG), which is a part of the IUCN
World Conservation Union, Species Survival Commission, notes one of the
problems confronting Madagascar's crocodilian sustainable use programs:
"Madagascar now represents a dilemma for the CSG and CITES as an economic
incentive to encourage conservation is very much needed but ranching cannot
be initiated while Madagascar continues to be a source of international illegal
trade." Crocodile Specialist Group Minutes, Steering Committee Aug. 1-2, &
Aug. 6, 1992, CROCODILE SPECIALIST GROUP NEWSLETTER (IUCN - World Con-
servation Union, Species Survival Comn'n, Crocodile Specialist Group, Gains-
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A. Delisting Appendix I Species: Exceptions to the Berne
Criteria
After the Berne Criteria were adopted, the Parties re-
verted to the resolution process in an attempt to alter the per-
ceived bias toward listing species on Appendix I and the
preclusive effect of such listing on commercial trade. Recog-
nizing that the Berne Criteria for transferring species from
Appendix I to Appendix II were at times overly stringent and
difficult to meet, the Parties adopted a series of exceptions to
the Berne Criteria which allowed for greater flexibility in the
appendix downlisting system, and under special circum-
stances, for limited commercial trade in Appendix I species.
These exceptions include captive breeding, ranching, the use
of quotas (possibly the most controversial) and the adoption
of specific criteria to downlist select African elephant
populations.
1. Captive Breeding
The first exception that the Parties may use to commer-
cially trade Appendix I species internationally is captive
breeding (otherwise known as "farming").9 3 Pursuant to
Conf. 2.12, all captive breeding programs of Appendix I spe-
cies for commercial purposes must be conducted in a "con-
trolled environment ... maintained without augmentation
from the wild ... [and] managed in a manner designed to
maintain the breeding stock indefinitely."94 In addition, the
Parties have adopted several other resolutions further regu-
lating captive breeding programs. 95
93. CITES, supra note 1, art. VII, para. 4. Captive breeding is the raising of
species in captivity in controlled conditions entirely independent from wild
populations. FITZGERALD, supra note 1, at 386. This exception was adopted af-
ter forceful lobbying by Argentina on behalf of its chinchilla captive breeding
operations. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 187.
94. Specimens Bred in Captivity or Artificially Propagated, CITES, 2d mtg.,
Conf. 2.12 (San Jos6, 1979) in BRAUTiGAM, supra note 7, at 52-53. Supporters of
captive breeding argue that removing a species from the wild and raising it
independently of wild populations does not have a detrimental effect on species'
survival.
95. There are now eleven Appendix I species raised under the captive-
breeding exception. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 7, at 25. Following the second
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At the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties in
Kyoto, the Parties acknowledged that "breeding a species in
captivity for commercial purposes can be an economic alter-
native to domestic livestock production in its place of origin
and thus provide an incentive for rural populations... to
develop an interest in its conservation."96 However, sustain-
able use advocates, such as the IUCN/SSC Crocodile Special-
ist Group (CSG),97 have generally been critical of the
conservation benefits purportedly provided by captive breed-
ing. The CSG agrees that captive breeding can benefit wild
populations if breeders are obligated to release a certain per-
centage of their production back into the wild.98 However,
the CSG argues captive breeding programs "usually have no
direct conservation benefits ... [and do] not foster the eco-
nomic dependence on the maintenance of healthy wild popu-
lations"99  necessary to provide an incentive for its
CITES Conference, the Parties adopted additional controls for captive breeding
programs. Under Resolution Conf. 4.15, the Parties must notify the Secretariat
of all captive breeding operations for which the Secretariat must establish a
register. Control of Captive Breeding Operations in Appendix I Species, CITES,
4th mtg., Conf. 4.15 (Gaborone, 1983) in BRAUTIGAM, supra note 7, at 68-69. All
captive breeding operations registered after July, 1987, must be approved by a
two thirds vote of the Parties in order to be included in the Register and may
similarly be removed by a two-thirds vote. Control Procedures for Commercial
Captive Breeding Operations, CITES, 6th mtg., Conf. 6.21 (Ottawa, 1987), in
BRAurImAM, supra note 7, at 90-92. All breeding operations must also use a
uniform marking system for captive-bred specimens. Id. at 91. In addition,
Resolution Conf. 7.10 recommends that when a species depends on captive-
breeding for its survival, commercial captive breeding should not be permitted.
Format and Criteria for Proposals to Register the First Commercial Captive-
Breeding Operation for an Appendix I Animal Species, CITES, 7th mtg., Conf.
7.10 (Lausanne, 1989) in BRAUTmAM, supra note 7, at 100-02. However, in
1992, the Parties in Kyoto passed a resolution redrafting the procedures for
registering and monitoring commercial captive-breeding operations for Appen-
dix I species. Guidelines for a Procedure to Register and Monitor Operations
Breeding Appendix I Animal Species for Commercial Purposes, 8th mtg., Conf.
8.15 (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Conf. 8.15]. The resolution effectively repealed
Resolution Conf. 4.15, 6.21 and 7.10. Id.
96. Conf. 8.15, supra note 95, at 1.
97. Harry Messel and J. Perran Ross, Crocodile Issues at CITES, 18 SPa-
cais 60 (June 1992). The CSG general strategy is to promote sustainable use
programs to conserve crocodilians while also "intervening forcefully to ensure
that they are sustainable." Id. at 61.
98. THORARNARSON, ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 6.
99. Id. The CSG is also critical of the captive breeding of "exotic
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protection.'00 In addition, captive breeding often requires
considerable capital investment which many rural communi-
ties do not have.1° 1
Favre also contends that the captive breeding exception
"sets up a legal and philosophical tension within the treaty"
by allowing Appendix I commercial trade when CITES specif-
ically provides that species threatened with extinction and
crocodilians" which it views as a potential threat to conservation efforts. Id. at
10. It fears that "exotic species" might escape into the wild and have detrimen-
tal effect on the native crocodilian populations or that breeding of exotic species
(such as the Nile crocodile which has a very high skin quality for tanning pur-
poses) will compete with local sustainable use conservation activities and
thereby "reduce the economic incentives for developing conservation-oriented
ranching programs." Id.
100. Curtis H. Freese and Carlos J. Saavedra, Prospects for Wildlife Manage-
ment in Latin America and the Caribbean, in NEoTROPICAL WILDLIFE USE AND
CONSERVATION 430 (John G. Robinson & Kent H. Redford eds., 1991).
The misconception that almost anything that breathes and breeds
can be profitably raised in a cage, corral, or artificial pond is still
widely spread among the new generation of Latin American wildlife
students. We believe that there is still far too much emphasis being
given to captive breeding by wildlife institutions in the region.
Many efforts directed at captive management are wasting valuable
time and limited fimds that could be better spent on wild popula-
tions. As Terborgh, Emmons and Freese (1986) and Emmons
(1987) point out, most wild species are ill suited for domestication
and captive management. Furthermore, even the successful cap-
tive breeding of wildlife for economic purposes will have little or no
significance for the conservation of wild populations, since it pro-
vides limited incentive for conserving free-ranging populations or
their habitats.
Id. at 438. A 1992 study of the wild bird trade published by TRAFFIC Interna-
tional also questions the conservation incentives produced by captive breeding.
[W]hether in range states or consumer countries, captive breeding does not
address the more fundamental problem posed to wild bird populations: habitat
loss through conversion of wild lands for agriculture and other income-produc-
ing purposes. Captive breeding offers little incentive to maintain bird popula-
tions in their natural habitat." Teresa A. Mulliken et al., The Wild Bird Trade
- An Overview, in SPECIES IN DANGER: PERCEPTIONS, CONSERVATION & MAN-
AGEMENT OF WILD BRDs IN TRADE 1, 19 (Jorgen B. Thomsen et al. eds., 1992).
101. See THoRBJARNARON, ACTIoN PLAN, supra note 70, at 6. See also Mul-
liken et al., supra note 100, at 19. Not only are most captive bird breeding
operations located in consumer countries, but "[t]he difficulties of obtaining ma-
terial resources and expertise necessary to establish successful breeding pro-
grams are likely to limit captive breeding operations in lesser-developed
countries for some time to come." Id.
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placed in Appendix I should not be commercially traded.'0 2
Critics of captive breeding also argue that it creates a poten-
tial market in illegal trade under the guise that the species is
being bred in captivity.10 3 Despite these fears, the Parties
have not yet cited illegal trade from captive breeding of Ap-
pendix I species as a major problem.
2. Ranching
The second exception to the Berne Criteria is ranching,
the rearing in a controlled environment of specimens taken
from the wild.' 0 Ranching Appendix I species is an alterna-
tive means to downlisting under the Berne Criteria which
was adopted in 1981 in New Delhi during the Third Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties. 0 5 Supporters argued that
closed cycle captive breeding was not realistically feasible
due in part to the degree of capital required, but open cycle
farming and ranching was. 0 6
To establish a ranching program, a Party's Management
Authority must submit a proposal to the Secretariat showing
that ranching of the species will not have a "significant detri-
mental impact on wild populations." 0 7 In addition, a Party
102. FAvRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 187. Favre notes that
"[captive-breeding], which is in effect a downlisting for population of an Appen-
dix I species, runs counter to the fundamental polcy point of the previous pro-
tective provisions of the treaty." Id.
103. Id.
104. Ranching, CITES, 3rd mtg., Conf. 3.15 (New Delhi, 1981) in BRAu-
TIGAM, supra note 7, at 64-65 [hereinafter Conf. 3.15]. Ranching differs consid-
erably from captive breeding or farming because it relies directly on the wild
population for its stock (eggs and young), while captive breeding programs are
self enclosed and function independently from the wild population. See FAVRE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 205-06.
105. Conf. 3.15, supra note 104, at 64-65. The resolution allows for species
in Appendix I to be transferred to Appendix II under a ranching program ap-
proved by a majority of the Parties in accordance with Article XV of the Conven-
tion. Id.
106. Telephone interview with J. Don Ashley, Alligator and Crocodile Con-
sultant with Ashley Associates (Nov. 12, 1992).
107. Conf. 3.15, supra note 104, at 65. Ranching programs tend to be most
successful with species that have a high infant mortality rate. FAvPE, INTERNA-
TioNAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 206. This is true of turtles and alligators but
not elephants. Id. Ranching of crocodilians can actually increase the wild pop-
ulation because removing eggs or infants from the wild and raising them in
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must provide "an assessment of the likelihood of... biological
and economic success .... " and show that "the operation will
be beneficial to the wild population through reintroduction or
in other ways."108 Ranching programs must institute a "uni-
form marking system"10 9 and provide the Secretariat with de-
tailed information regarding the program in the Parties'
annual report.110
The Parties vote on all ranching programs after close
scrutiny of the proposals. 111 Crocodilian ranching programs
captivity increase their chances of survival: When some are returned back,
more are added than would naturally have survived. Interview with John
Thorbjarnarson, Program Officer for Latin America, The Wildlife Conservation
Society, in Bronx, New York (Oct. 29, 1992).
108. Conf. 3.15, supra note 104, at 65 (emphasis added). In 1992, the Parties
also adopted an additional crocodilian ranching criteria. See Additional Crite-
ria for the Establishment of Captive-Breeding Operations and for the Assess-
ment of Ranching Proposals for Crocodilians, CITES, 8th mtg., Conf. 8.22
(Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Conf. 8.22].
109. Trade in Ranched Specimens, CITES, 5th mtg., Conf. 5.16 (Buenos
Aires, 1985) in BRAUTIGAM, supra note 7, at 82-85 [hereinafter Conf. 5.16]. The
purpose of the resolution is to provide for a different and uniform marking sys-
tem for products derived from ranched populations to avoid confusion with
other products and to provide "adequate protection... [to] wild populations of
species for which ranching has been approved .... " Id. at 82.
110. Monitoring and Reporting Procedures for Ranching Operations, CITES,
6th mtg., Conf. 6.22 (Ottawa, 1987) in BRAUTIGAM, supra note 7, at 93-94 [here-
inafter Conf. 6.22].
111. In Kyoto, only four orthe six crocodilian ranching resolutions were ap-
proved. Indonesia and Madagascar withdrew their resolutions due to lack of
support from the Secretariat and the Crocodile Specialist Group. CITES, 8th
mtg., 6th sess., Comm. I 8.6, (Kyoto, Mar. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Comm. 1 8.6];
Crocodile Specialist Group Steering Committee, Minutes, 9-11 Nov. 1991, CRO-
ODILE SPECIALIST GROUP NEWSLETTER (IUCN-The World Conservation Union,
Species Survival Comm'n, Crocodile Specialist Group, Gainsville, Fla.) Oct.-
Dec. 1991, at 9-10 [hereinafter CSG Steering Comm. Nov. 1991 Minutes].
The Crocodile Specialist Group carries great weight when it considers or
endorses resolutions pertaining to crocodilians. Telephone interview with Peter
Brazaitis, Head Curator of the Central Park Zoo, in New York, N.Y. (July 24,
1992). The Parties know that without the CSG's support there is little likeli-
hood of their resolutions being passed and the CSG is able to put considerable
pressure on countries to compel them to improve CITES compliance. Id. The
Parties openly seek out CSG's assistance and review. The fact that the CSG
incorporates members from the crocodilian skin and tanning industry also gives
it credibility as having balanced views on the issues of trade and conservation.
Id. However, some feel that the interests of the crocodilian trade industry dom-
inate the policy decisions of the CSG and that the group has veered too far from
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in the United States, New Guinea, Australia, and other coun-
tries have been particularly successful.1 12 Initially, some
Parties expressed concern that the ranching provision and
the downlisting of the American alligator would stimulate an
illegal market.113 However, supporters insisted that endan-
gered species and their habitats could only be protected from
agricultural and developmental pressures if some form of eco-
nomic gain could be derived from their use."34 While the con-
trols placed on species downlisted to Appendix II under the
ranching resolution have been very effective, illegal trade in
other Appendix II species, such as Latin and Central Ameri-
can crocodilian skins remains a considerable problem.115
3. Quotas for Appendix I Species
Although not mentioned in the original CITES' text, the
Parties adopted the use of two types of trade quotas for Ap-
pendix I species as a third exception to the Berne Criteria: a
specific leopard quota and a general quota open to all Appen-
dix I species which meet set criteria and are captively bred or
farmed.116
its original focus on crocodilian conservation to its present emphasis on croco-
dilian management. Id.
112. Ranching Stimulates Growth in Crocodile Market; Trade Controls Still
Inadequate In Many Areas, TRAFFIC (I.S..), June 1990, at 1 [hereinafter
Ranching Stimulates Growth]. The Crocodile Specialists Group (CSG) has long
advocated the sustainable use of alligators and crocodilians through ranching
to provide economic benefits to local communities and to "maintain a direct link
between the health of wild populations and the ability to obtain a rearing
stock." THoRBJARNARsON, ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 5-6.
113. Nov. 12, 1992 Ashley Interview, supra note 106. This issue was initially
debated at the Second Conference of the Parties (held in San Jos6, in 1979). Id.
"The risk of ranching is that trade will occur not only with the raised young, but
with illegally caught adults. At the point of Customs control, it may be very
difficult to distinguish between ranched adults and wild caught adults." FAVRE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 206.
114. Nov. 12, 1992 Ashley Interview, supra note 106. See THoERBJARNASON,
ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 4; Goldstein, supra note 69, at 987.
115. Ranching Stimulates Growth, supra note 112, at 1-2.
116. Favre, Tension Points, supra note 44, at 255. Quotas may be used to
control ranched species or harvests (i.e. hunting). Id.
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a. Leopard Quotas
In 1983, upon determining that select leopard popula-
tions in some sub-Saharan countries were not endangered,
the Parties approved Conference 4.13 which allows leopard
hunting under an export quota for non-commercial trade
only.117 This resolution, however, does not change the spe-
cies' Appendix I listing but falls within CITES' requirements:
that (1) trade is not for "primarily commercial purposes;""18
(2) it is "not detrimental to the survival of the species;" 1 9 and
(3) it is "subject to particularly strict regulation." 20 The leop-
ards must be shipped with a "self-locking tag attached which
indicates the state of export, the number of the specimen in
relation to the annual quota and the calendar year to which
the quota applies .... "1 21
b. Conference 5.21 and 7.14
At the 1985 Meeting of the Conference of the Parties in
117. BRAUTmAM, supra note 7, at 20 (emphasis added). Conf. 4.13 was sub-
sequently revised by Resolution Conference 7.7 which defines non-commercial
use as follows:
[T]he Management Authority of the state of import may be satisfied
that the said skins are not to be used for primarily commercial pur-
poses if-
i) the skins are acquired by the owner in the country of
export and are being imported as personal items that
will not be sold in the country of import; and
ii) the owner imports no more than two skins any calendar
year if this is authorized by the legislation of the coun-
try of export ....
Quotas for Leopard Hunting and Skins for Personal Use, CITES, 7th mtg.,
Conf. 7.7 (Lausanne, 1989) in BRAUTIGAM, supra note 7, at 95-96 [hereinafter
Conf. 7.7].
118. CITES, supra note 1, art. I, para. 3(c).
119. Id. art. III, para. 3(a).
120. Id. art. II, para. 1.
121. Conf. 7.7 supra note 117, at 96. The Conference of the Parties at Kyoto
approved an export quota of 2,050 leopard skins for sub-Saharan Africa. Eighth
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Aug. 1992
at 13-14 [hereinafter Eighth Meeting of CITES]. The countries of Botswana,
Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe had originally proposed that the leop-
ard be downlisted from Appendix I to Appendix II as its populations had recov-
ered to the point where it was considered a pest in some areas. Id.
Nonetheless, after lengthy debate the Parties agreed to keep the leopard on
Appendix I pursuant to the quota system. Id.
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Buenos Aires, the Parties adopted a second quota system,
Resolution 5.21, which allowed for commercial international
trade and transfer of a species from Appendix I to Appendix
II if approved by the Parties.1 22 Like Conf. 2.23, the new
quota system was also limited to species in Appendix I which
were not listed using the Berne Criteria. 123
Nonetheless, the requirements of Conf. 5.21 were
weak, 2 4 and in 1989, the Parties repealed the resolution and
122. Special Criteria for the Transfer of Taxa from Appendix Ito Appendix II,
CITES, 5th mtg., Conf. 5.21 (Buenos Aires, 1985) in BRAuTIGAM, supra note 7,
at 78-79 [hereinafter Conf. 5.211. Resolution 5.21 noted "that the establishment
of quotas for the management and exploitation of wildlife is a conservation pro-
cedure used in many cases at the national level .... " Id. at 78. The main
justification for downlisting under the quota system was that the Berne Crite-
ria made it exceedingly difficult to remove Appendix I species and that the
quota system was warranted in order to allow the Parties an opportunity to
utilize and benefit from their natural resources in international trade. Id. In-
terestingly enough, the same reasoning was also used six years earlier at the
second meeting of the Conference of the Parties in the adoption of Resolution
Conf. 2.23. See Conf. 2.23, supra note 55 at 62.
123. Conf. 5.21, supra note 122, at 78. Similar to Resolution 2.23, Resolution
5.21 justified itself by the fact that the Berne Criteria were not applied to all
species equally and that they posed considerable obstacles to downlisting a spe-
cies from Appendix I. Resolution 5.21 states:
NOTING that the Berne Criteria for the addition of species and
other taxa to Appendices I and II (Resolution Conf. 1.1) have not
been applied to those species which have been listed by the Plenipo-
tentiary Conference (Washington, D.C., 1973), or, in some cases, by
the Conference of the Parties at its first (Berne, 1976) or second
meeting (San Jos6, 1979);
ACKNOWLEDGING that the Berne Criteria for the deletion of spe-
cies and other taxa from Appendices I and II (Resolution Conf. 1.2)
are very difficult to fulfil [sic] in the case of some of these species
because they require positive scientific evidence of changing biologi-
cal status showing recovery sufficient to justify deletion;
RECOGNIZING that there are obviously some taxa listed in Ap-
pendix I that either never met the Berne Criteria for inclusion or
have recovered since their inclusion, although this cannot be
demonstrated today because their population status was not deter-
mined when they were included in the appendix ....
Id. In order to downlist under the quota system, the Parties had to show that it
was "virtually impossible to supply the data required by [the Berne Criteria for
downlisting] within reasonable time or with reasonable effort," and that there
were "populations of such species [that could] withstand a certain level of ex-
ploitation for commercial trade .... " Id. at 79.
124. Conf. 5.21 simply requires that there be "sufficient basis to establish
that the species should be included in Appendix H rather than Appendix I
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adopted a new quota resolution to temporarily downlist quali-
fying Appendix I species to Appendix II (Conference 7.14).125
The new resolution sets out three requirements: Parties
must show difficulty in meeting the Berne Criteria; "demon-
strate" that the subject species is "non-migratory" (i.e., able to
be managed by a single Party); and that it is "capable of with-
standing a certain level of exploitation... [without] endan-
ger[ing] the survival of the species in the wild."126 The word
"demonstrate" requires a Party to provide "sufficient evidence
from a well-documented scientific report on population size
and geographical range" that indicates that the species
should be transferred to Appendix 1I.127 This language is
very similar to the scientific requirements of the Berne
Criteria.
Downlisting from Appendix I to II under the quota sys-
tem is not permanent. Under 7.14, the quota system is tem-
porary, allowing the Parties to trade in a species while
working to meet the downlisting requirements either under
the Berne Criteria or the ranching program (Conf. 3.15).128 If
after "two intervals between regular meetings" a species is
not downlisted to Appendix II under either of these criteria,
the species is to be returned to Appendix J.129 Thus, the reso-
under the terms of Resolution Conf. 1.1 [of the Berne Criteria]." Conf. 5.21,
supra note 122, at 79. However, the resolution did not indicate what was meant
by "sufficient basis." Id.
125. Special Criteria For the Transfer of Taxa from Appendix I to Appendix
II, CITES, 7th mtg., Conf. 7.14 (Lausanne, 1989) in BRAuTIGAM, supra note 7, at
105, 106 [hereinafter Conf. 7.14].
126. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
127. Id. While Resolutions 2.23 and 7.14 both seek to reduce the burden of
downlisting pre-Berne Criteria Appendix I listings, the standard of proof which
the two resolutions employ are different. Conf. 2.23 requires "a careful review
of available information on the status of the species." Conf. 2.23, supra note 55,
at 62-63. Conf. 7.14 requires "sufficient evidence from a well-documented scien-
tific report on population size and geographical range ... to establish that the
species should be included in Appendix II rather than Appendix I ...." Conf.
7.14, supra note 125, at 106. Conf. 2.23 also deletes species from Appendix I
thereby allowing for commercial trade, while Conf. 7.14 temporarily transfers a
species to Appendix I1 allowing for commercial trade under a limited quota sys-
tem. See Conf. 2.23, supra note 55, at 62; Conf. 7.14, supra note 125, at 106.
128. Conf. 7.14, supra note 125, at 107.
129. Id. An interesting question is the effect that Conf. 2.23 and Conf. 7.14
have on each other. Both resolutions apply to the downlisting of species listed
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lution allows flexibility in meeting the Parties' economic
needs while remaining true to CITES' conservation
objectives.
Quotas for Appendix I species temporarily downlisted to
Appendix II have not been granted to many species,130 but
the system has been relatively successful. Four countries
(Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia) in 1989 and
two countries (Ethiopia and Kenya) in 1992 successfully
transferred their Nile crocodile populations from a quota sys-
tem to permanent Appendix II status under the ranching pro-
gram (Conf. 7.14).3-3 However, three crocodile species were
transferred back to Appendix I because Conf. 7.14's require-
ments were not met.'3 2
c. Deciding When to Draw the Line With
Appendix I Quotas
Although the quota system has been relatively success-
ful, it is not entirely free from controversy. One problem is
assuring that management programs do not have a detrimen-
tal impact on a species and that they adhere to standards set
by the Parties. For example, three quota listings approved at
the 1992 Conference (the Nile crocodile in Madagascar and
Sudan and the Salt Water crocodile in Indonesia) drew con-
siderable criticism because of the questionable compliance
records of the Parties involved. 33 Although both Madagas-
on Appendix I that were not subject to the Berne Criteria. However, while
Conf. 7.14 is a temporary delisting system which eventually requires a Party to
fulfill either the Berne Criteria or the ranching criteria under Conf. 3.15 (New
Delhi, 1981), Conf. 2.23 employs its own criteria requiring simply "a careful
review of available material" for delisting to occur permanently. Conf. 2.23,
supra note 55, at 63. Technically, both resolutions apply.
130. See Eighth Meeting of CITES, supra note 121. During the 1992 meeting
of the Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, only five species were accepted
for export quotas and three of the five were crocodiles: Leopard, Nile crocodile,
African slender-snouted crocodile, Dwarf crocodile and the Asiatic bonytongue.
Id. at 8.
131. Id.
132. Id. The African slender-snouted crocodile and the West African Dwarf
crocodile in the Congo and the Nile crocodile in the Congo, Cameroon and Su-
dan were all returned to Appendix I status as none of the countries submitted
proposals to extend the quotas or employ ranching programs. Id.
133. Id. at 8-9.
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car's and Indonesia's quota programs had been in existence
since 1985 (a longer period than the requisite two intervals
between meetings), Madagascar's exports for 1987 and 1989
exceeded the number of skins recorded in its CITES annual
report and serious questions remained regarding both coun-
tries' ability to prevent illegal trade, 13 4 their requests for quo-
tas were nonetheless extended.13 5
The CSG supported the downlisting of Indonesia's Salt
Water crocodile (C. porosus) to Appendix II under the ranch-
ing provision and also supported the eventual quota program.
In response to criticism by some NGOs, the CSG defended its
stance, arguing that the "transfer of the Indonesian popula-
tions of C. porosus to Appendix I would not be beneficial to
conservation of crocodiles in Indonesia or the development of
sustainable management plans.' 3 6 The CSG further noted
that "support of the Indonesian program was a continuing
process that would not allow Indonesia to revert to ineffective
management following CITES and noted that return of Indo-
nesia's porosus populations to Appendix I could be quickly
and easily accomplished." 37 Indonesia's request was granted
"contingent upon [its] meeting commitments" under the
quota resolution.138
134. IUCN Species Survival Commission Trade Specialist Group et al., Anal-
yses of Proposals to Amend the CITES Appendices, 5-6, 9-10 (Jan. 1992) (un-
published document, on file with the Pace Environmental Law Review)
[hereinafter IUCN Analyses of Proposals].
135. Id. at 9. Madagascar and Indonesia originally submitted resolutions for
the permanent downlisting of the Nile crocodile (Madagascar) and Salt Water
crocodile (Indonesia) pursuant to the ranching program (Conf. 3.15). However,
Indonesia and Madagascar both withdrew their ranching resolutions with the
understanding that they would be allowed to continue trading under the quota
provision. CITES, Summary Report of the Plenary Meeting, 8th Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, 9th Sess., Plen. 8.9, at 4 (Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinafter
Plen. 8.9 summary].
136. Crocodile Specialist Group Steering Co., Minutes, 29 Feb. 1992, Kyoto,
Japan, CROCODILE SPECIALIST GROUP NEWSLETTER (IUCN World Conservation
Union, Species Survival Commission, Crocodile Specialist Group, Gainsville,
Fla.), Jan.-Mar. 1992, at 8 [hereinafter CSG Steering Comm. Feb. 1992
Minutes].
137. Id. at 7.
138. CSG Steering Comm. Aug. 1992 Minutes, supra note 92, at 11. Follow-
ing the Kyoto Convention, a group of three CSG members traveled to Indonesia
at that country's expense to monitor its continued progress in crocodile manage-
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The CSG initially opposed Sudan's request to continue
its Nile crocodile Appendix II status and to receive a one-time
quota to export a stockpile of 8,000 skins.139 Until 1990, Su-
dan had a reservation on the Nile crocodile and a wild quota
of 5,000 skins.140 In 1989, at the Seventh Meeting of the Par-
ties, Sudan's request for a similar export quota was re-
fused.141  The CSG later conditionally supported the
resolution provided that certain conditions were met.142 As a
compromise between these trade/conservation tensions, the
Parties transferred the Sudan Nile crocodile to Appendix I,
and permitted sale of its stockpile to Egypt for domestic use
ment and prevention of illegal trade. The study found that declining skin sales
had reduced the funds to implement management actions and that a lack of
uniformity existed in farm stock reports. Id. at 10. Noting that continuation of
Indonesia's export quota depended on their compliance with CITES, Ginette
Hemley of TRAFFIC concluded that "little concrete progress appeared to have
been made." Id. at 11. CSG's Chairman further insisted that a lack of funds
was no excuse for Indonesia's failure to comply with CITES. Id. At its spring
1993 meeting, the CSG voted to withdraw its support for Indonesia's crocodilian
management program due to its continued failure to institute changes in its
program. Oct. 29, 1992 ThorbJarnarson Interview, supra note 107.
139. Id. at 6. Sudan's stockpile was the result of hunting which took place
due to the country's failure to repeal local hunting laws after the CITES quota
had expired and Sudan could have legally traded its stockpile had it requested
a quota in 1990. CSG Steering Comm. Nov. 1991 Minutes, supra note 111, at 10.
Although the CSG sympathized with Sudan, it felt that "any support or contin-
ued precedent for special quotas [would only] encourage irregular trade and
discourage effective management." Id. TRAFFIC also recommended rejecting
the proposal. TRAFFIC, RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE
CITES APPENDICES AT THE Eiam MEETNG OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PAR-
TIES TO CITES, 16 (March 1992).
140. IUCN Analyses of Proposals, supra note 134, at 41. IUCN reported that
Sudan had not issued annual reports for 1986-88 and was late in issuing its
1989 report by nine months. Id. The report stated:
Sudan reported exporting 5012 C. niloticus [Nile crocodile]
skins in 1990, but, before then, all the evidence of trade derived
from the reports of the importing countries. Although Sudan held a
reservation on C. niloticus until 1990, it was required to report on
its crocodile skin trade under the terms of Resolution Conf. 5.21. It
is also in breach of Resolution Conf. 4.25, which recommends that
Parties holding reservations for Appendix I species should treat
them as if they were in Appendix II.
Id. The report also indicated that war in the southern part of the country made
it impossible to control hunting. Id.
141. Id.
142. CSG Steering Comm. Feb. 1992 Minutes, supra note 136, at 6.
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only, provided that proceeds went to TRAFFIC for surveys in
the region.143
The development and implementation of a management
program is a complex process. But just how much time
should a Party be given to develop and implement a manage-
ment program? What if a country's management program is
ineffective but shows signs of improvement? Should a species
be returned to Appendix I until the Party improves its pro-
gram? How rampant must abuses be before one draws the
line and completely restricts trade? There are no clear cut
answers to these questions and drawing the line is no easy
task.
B. Downlisting the African Elephant: Conference 7.9
The most recent exception to the Berne Criteria is Con-
ference 7.9 "Terms of Reference for the Panel of Experts on
the African Elephant and Criteria for the Transfer of Certain
African Elephant Populations from Appendix I to Appendix
II."14 In 1977 the African elephant was initially listed in Ap-
pendix II.145 However, over slightly more than ten years Af-
rican elephant populations were reduced by nearly half.146
143. Comm. 1 8.6, supra note 111, at 5. Following the Convention in Kyoto,
Dietrich Jeldon of the CSG successfully inspected and tagged all of the 8,000
skins, accompanied by a Sudanese army escort. CSG Steering Comm. Aug.
1992 Minutes, supra note 92, at 6.
144. Terms of Reference for the Panel of Experts on the African Elephant and
Criteria for the Transfer of Certain African Elephant Populations from Appen-
dix I to Appendix II, CITES, 7th mtg., Conf. 7.9 (Lausanne, 1989) in BRAU-
TIGAm, supra note 7, at 97 [hereinafter Conf. 7.9].
145. Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84
AM. J. NT'L L. 1, 12.; FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 125.
146. Glennon, supra note 145, at 18. However, there may be hope after all
for the elephant. One conservation method that CITES has not contemplated
and that Zimbabwe has recently begun is "ecohunting." Bill Keller, Splatball
Safari Owner Says Shooting Animals With Paint Is Better for the Environment,
DAL. MoRN. NEWS, Sept. 25, 1994 at IA. Ecohunting is also referred to as
"splatball." Id. In splatball, a hunter stalks his prey in the usual manner, but
instead of killing the animal (usually elephants), he shoots it with a paintball
containing a water based paint. Id. Here, everyone wins; the hunter gets his
trophy (a videotape of his excursion), Zimbabwe gets revenue and animal con-
tinues to live. Id. For the most part, the elephants seem only mildly distracted
by this practice. Id. at 32A. However, all is not fun and games. On a more
serious note, if the animal becomes so enraged that he must be killed to protect
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
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Approximately 78% of all the ivory on the market during the
late 1970's and early 1980's came from illegally poached ele-
phants.147 High profits,148 demand, 49 corruption, poverty,
and a lack of resources and control in worked ivory contrib-
uted to poaching and the demise of the African elephant. 50
Despite numerous efforts to improve regulations, CITES was
unable to prevent illegal ivory from entering the market 5'
largely because of its inability to "sufficiently diminish the in-
centives of producers, middlemen or consumers" 152 and the
inability to distinguish legal and illegal ivory even with the
CITES marking system. 53
In the 1980's, the effects of elephant poaching began to
the "ecohunting" party, the splatball hunter is required to pay the $6000 fee
that Zimbabwe requires for actually killing any elephant. Id. In addition, some
groups object to this practice as degrading to the animals. Id.
147. Orenstein Interview, supra note 5. Kevin D. Hill, Associate Professor of
Law, at Ohio Northern University describes the "methodical pattern" followed
by poachers. "Poachers, seeking the animals with the largest tusks, first hunt
the males and the older matriarchs. When the supply of older elephants is ex-
hausted, the poachers hunt the medium aged ones, including prime breeding-
age females. Eventually, the populations are reduced to only young elephants
with very small tusks." Kevin D. Hill, The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species: Fifteen Years Later, 13 Loy. L.A. INr'L & CoIPn. L.J. 231,
258 (1990) (citations omitted).
148. From the late 1960's to the mid-1980's the price of ivory jumped from $5
per kilogram to $100 per kilogram. Hill, supra note 147, at 259.
149. World demand for ivory in the 1980's was estimated to be 800 tons an-
nually. Id.
150. Glennon, supra note 145, at 20-22; see also Hill, supra note 147, at 259-
64 (1990).
151. Hill, supra note 147, at 260-62. Recognizing the increase in the ivory
trade and the ineffectiveness of the permit process, in 1981 the Parties adopted
a new ivory marking system "using punch dies." Id. at 260-61. The system had
little effect in stopping the illegal trade of ivory. Id. Four years later, at the
Fifth Conference of the Parties, further attempts were made to improve ivory
controls through the implementation of "a more centralized regulatory struc-
ture." Id. at 261. The Parties established an Ivory Control Unit and "ivory
quota procedures to regulate trade between CITES member and nonmember
countries." Id. "Despite high hopes, the 1986 quota system failed just as its two
predecessors. Even though high quotas were established to draw stockpiles of
illegal ivory into the officially regulated system, most traders preferred to
smuggle the ivory rather than bother with the paperwork to obtain a quota
authorization." Id. at 262.
152. Glennon, supra note 145, at 20.
153. Orenstein Interview, supra note 5. According to Dr. Orenstein, at-
tempting to construct a dam half way across the river simply did not work. Id.
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receive world-wide attention. In 1988, Kenyan Wildlife au-
thorities called for a complete ban on ivory trade, and in June
1989, England, France, the United States, West Germany
and the European Community also issued moratoria on its
trade. 54 Kenya, Tanzania and other east African countries
whose elephant populations were nearly decimated, favored a
new Appendix I listing.155 However, southern African coun-
tries such as Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa, opposed
it as their elephant populations were not as badly affected by
poaching.s56 During the 1989 Conference of the Parties, ef-
forts by southern African nations to "split-list" the African el-
ephant to allow selected states to continue trading in ivory 57
were rejected and the African elephant was transferred from
Appendix II to Appendix 1.158
Recognizing the interests of states with more abundant
elephant populations that were unable to meet the Berne Cri-
teria (Conf. 1.1) for transferring the species to Appendix II,
the Parties adopted new elephant downlisting criteria (Conf.
7.9).159 Conf. 7.9 provides for the creation of a panel of ex-
perts on the African elephant to evaluate a Party's request to
downlist its populations to Appendix II, and instructs it to
draft a final report of its findings to be presented to the Par-
ties. 60 The Resolution establishes guidelines for the expert
154. Glennon, supra note 145, at 15-17; but see Raymond Bonner, Crying
Wolf Over the Elephants, How the International Wildlife Community Got Stam-
peded Into Banning Ivory, N.Y. Tnmds, Feb. 7, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 17-19, 30
(Bonner contends that not all elephants were threatened by poaching and that
wildlife organizations such as the World Wildlife Foundation supported the ban
on ivory for political and economic reasons).
155. Hill, supra note 147, at 262.
156. Id.
157. Glennon, supra note 145, at 17.
158. See Philippe J. Sans & Albert P. Bedecarr6, Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species: The Role of Public Interest Non-Governmental
Organizations in Ensuring the Effective Enforcement of the Ivory Trade Ban, 17
ENVTL. AFF. 799, 799-800 (1990).
159. Conf. 7.9, supra note 144, at 97.
160. Id. The resolution seeks to assure that the interests of the African na-
tions are fairly represented in the downlisting process and that the basis for its
removal from Appendix I should rest largely on the findings of experts in the
field. Id. at 97-99. This is the first time that CITES has resorted to a compre-
hensive group of "experts" with no particular Party affiliation to evaluate a spe-
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
ENDANGERED SPECIES
panel' 61  and the Parties162  to consider when deciding
whether to downlist, covering three main areas: 1) the state
of the elephant populations themselves; 2) a Party's ability to
conserve and manage its elephant populations; and 3) the ad-
equacy of its ivory trade controls.' 63
These guidelines do not differ substantially from the
Berne Criteria downlisting procedures, 164 in that they re-
des standing and the potential effects delisting will have upon it. The CITES
Standing Committee nominates the Panel of Experts (not to exceed six) "after
consultation as appropriate with UNEP, IUCN, TRAFFIC International, the
affected range state and the region concerned." Id. at 98.
161. Id. at 97-99. Conf. 7.9 states:
h) that in evaluating the status and management of an elephant
population the Panel of Experts shall take into account:
i) the viability and sustainability of the population, and po-
tential risks;
ii) the affected range state's demonstrated ability to monitor
the subjected population; and
iii) the effectiveness of current anti-poaching measures;
i) that in evaluating the affected range state's ability to control
trade in ivory from African elephants, the Panel of Experts shall
take into account:
i) whether total levels of offtake from both legal and illegal
killing are sustainable;
ii) whether control of ivory stocks is adequate to prevent the
mixing of legal and illegal ivory;
iii) whether law enforcement is effective; and
iv) whether enforcement controls are sufficient to ensure that
no significant amounts of ivory taken or traded illegally
from other countries are traded within or through the terri-
tory of the affected range state ....
Id. at 98-99 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 99. Section (j) of the resolution defines the criteria by which Par-
ties decide on the transfer of an elephant population:
Parties should take into account the report of the Panel of Experts
and in particular:
i) the status of the elephant populations in the affected range
state;
ii) the affected range state's ability to manage and conserve its
population effectively; and
iii) the affect of range state's ability to control trade in elephant
ivory ....
Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 97-99.
164. The Berne Criteria require:
positive scientific evidence that the plant or animal can withstand
the exploitation resulting from the removal of protection .... Such
1994]
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quire "scientific evidence" of elephant "numbers and
trends,"165 assurances that elephant populations will remain
"sustainable" with legal and illegal hunting, and detailed
analysis of likely commercial trade effects. 166 This is the first
time a CITES resolution considered the effects of both legal
and illegal trade in its analysis. In addition, the resolution
directly refers to a species' sustainability to assure that it will
be maintained "at a level consistent with its role in the eco-
systems in which it occurs," as required by CITES Article
IV. 167
V. The 1992 Kyoto Conference and the Zimbabwe
Resolutions: Attempts to Amend the Convention
Under the Guise of Sustainable Use
A. The Zimbabwe Resolutions: An Overview
Following the 1989 Appendix I listing of the African ele-
phant, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and
Malawi decided to continue selling ivory and entered reserva-
tions on the species.' 68 Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana,
Namibia and Malawi (but not South Africa) signed a treaty
establishing the Southern African Center for Ivory Marketing
(SACIM).169 In fall 1991, South Africa, the four SACIM na-
tions and various other representatives attended an "invita-
tion-only" meeting in Zimbabwe to discuss CITES and its
future. °70 Following the meeting, Zimbabwe, Zambia,171 Bot-
swana, Namibia and Malawi drafted and submitted a series
evidence should include at least a well documented population sur-
vey, an indication of the population trend of the species, showing
recovery sufficient to justify deletion, and an analysis of the poten-
tial for commercial trade in the species of population.
Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46.
165. Conf. 7.9, supra note 144, at 97.
166. Id. at 99.
167. CITES, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 3.
168. Glennon, supra note 145, at 17.
169. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 7.
170. Id.
171. With the election of a new government in January 1992, Zambia
changed its position on the African elephant and withdrew its reservation.
Orenstein Interview, supra note 5.
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of resolutions at the 1992 CITES Conference of the Parties
(held in Kyoto, Japan).17 2
Five of these resolutions (the Zimbabwe Resolutions), dif-
fered considerably from past resolutions submitted at the
Conference of the Parties. The premise underlying the
Zimbabwe Resolutions was that CITES should allow interna-
tional commercial trade of fauna or flora, even in Appendix I
species, if the traded species is the product of legitimate sus-
tainable use practices. In essence, the proposed Resolutions
sought to change the Berne Criteria and to alter the princi-
ples on which CITES was formed.17 3
The first two Zimbabwe Resolutions (Documents 8.48
and 8.49) interpreted CITES Article III to allow commercial
trade in Appendix I species if it was the product of sustaina-
ble use.17 4 The third draft resolution (Document 8.50), pro-
posed new listing criteria (the Kyoto Criteria) based on more
scientific data to replace the Berne Criteria.175 A fourth draft
resolution (Document 8.51), sought to provide range states
with greater authority over amendments to Appendix I or II
for species within their borders.1 76 The fifth resolution (Doc-
ument 8.52) attempted to limit the ability of importing na-
tions to adopt rules and regulations stricter than CITES'
172. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 7-8. The
resolutions introduced were:
Doc. 8.48* Recognition of the Benefits of Trade in Wildlife
Doc. 8.49* Reconsideration of Primarily Commercial Purposes
Doc. 8.50 Criteria for Amendments to the Appendices
Doc. 8.51* Support of Range States For Amendments to Appendices I and H
Doc. 8.52* Stricter Domestic Measures
* Zambia withdrew its co-sponsorship of Documents 8.48, 8.49, 8.51, 8.52 dur-
ing the Conference. CITES, 8th mtg., 4th sess., Plea 8.4 (Kyoto, Mar. 3, 1992)
[hereinafter Plea 8.4].
173. See infra Section V.
174. Recognition of Benefits of Trade in Wildlife, CITES, 8th mtg., Doc. 8.48
at 5 (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Doe. 8.48]; Reconsideration of "Primarily Com-
mercial Purposes", CITES, 8th mtg., Doc. 8.49 at 5 (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter
Doe. 8.49].
175. Criteria for Amendment to the Appendices, CITES, 8th mtg., Doc. 8.50
(Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Doc. 8.50].
176. Support of the Range States for Amendments to Appendices I and II,
CITES, 8th mtg., Doc. 8.51, at 3 (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Doc. 8.51].
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provisions.'7 7 Finally, the drafters of the Zimbabwe Resolu-
tions proposed to downlist select African elephant popula-
tions to Appendix II to allow for limited international
commercial trade in ivory and other elephant parts from
countries with sustainably managed, stable elephant
populations. 178
The Zimbabwe Resolutions were not widely approved by
the Parties and most were withdrawn or redrafted into less
controversial forms when it became evident they would not
win approval.' 7 9 However, the resolutions expressed their
authors' frustration over barriers they believed CITES and
importing nations erected against sustainable use and the
fundamental differences they perceived between the way in
which countries approached conservation within CITES.' 80
In addition, the Zimbabwe Resolutions drafters succeeded in
provoking a continued debate over the use of the Berne
Criteria.
B. Proposed Resolution 8.48: The Benefits of Trade
Trade in Appendix I species may only occur if it: (1) "will
not be detrimental to the survival of the species involved"l 8
and (2) "is not to be used for primarily commercial pur-
poses." 8 2 The first Zimbabwe Resolution, "Recognition of the
Benefits of Trade in Wildlife," (Doc. 8.48) addressed the
CITES "nondetrimental" requirement and challenged the no-
tion that commercial trade has "only negative effects on the
conservation of species." 1 3 The background document ac-
177. Stricter Domestic Measures, CITES, 8th mtg., Doc. 8.52, at 5 (Kyoto,
1992) [hereinafter Doc. 8.52].
178. See Tape of CITES, 8th mtg., Comm. I mtg., Debate on the African Ele-
phant, taped and transcribed by Ronald Orenstein, (Kyoto, Mar. 10, 1992)
[hereinafter Elephant Debate].
179. CITES, 8th mtg., 9th sess., Comm. 1 8.9 (Kyoto, Mar.10, 1992) [herein-
after Comm. 1 8.9].
180. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172.
181. CITES, supra note 1, art. Im, paras. 3(a), (5)(a). The Scientific Authori-
ties of both the exporting and importing states must make this determination.
Id.
182. Id. art. III, paras. 3(c), (5)(c). This determination is to be made by the
importing state Management Authority. Id.
183. Doc. 8.48, supra note 174, at 6.
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companying this resolution argued that:
Trade is too often viewed in the CITES context as a
simple matter of harvesting wild resources for financial
gain. In practice, many of the most valuable wildlife prod-
ucts available for international trade from developing
countries do not result from deliberate exploitation policies
to obtain the products. They may result from natural mor-
tality or they may arise as a by-product of management of
species populations to maintain habitats. Legal trade in
such products can be used to enhance species populations
... [and this] trade should also be viewed as non-
detrimental.18 4
Doc. 8.48 proposed that the Parties view trade as beneficial
when: (1) it is "based upon sustainable use," (2) the monies
raised are used to benefit wildlife management or "to provide
income at a national level to developing countries," and (3)
the country's Scientific Authority has assured that the "ex-
port will not be detrimental to the survival of the species
involved."' 8 5
Those present at the Kyoto conference generally agreed
that commercial trade can potentially be beneficial to wildlife
conservation.'8 6 Beyond this, however, there was much disa-
184. Id. at 2, 6. The drafters recommended "that rules adopted by the Par-
ties do not penalise [sic] ranching, breeding or propagation operations but
rather encourage them where appropriate." Id. at 6.
185. Id. at 5. The draft recommends:
a) that trade be viewed as beneficial when it is based upon sus-
tainable use and the financial returns are used:
i) to provide income to rural wildlife-producer communities; or ii) to
meet the costs of protected-area maintenance; or iii) to further in-
vest in wildlife development by landholders; or iv) to provide in-
come at a national level to developing countries; or v) for any
combination of these purposes; and, in the context of species listed
in the appendices to CITES, the Scientific Authorities comply fully
with the provisions of Article I, para. 2(a) and IV, para. 2(a) of the
Convention ....
Id. See also CITES, supra note 1, art. III, para. 2(a), art. IV, para. 2(a).
186. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172. As the CITES Secretariat noted:
An affirmation that there are circumstances in which wildlife trade
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greement over the proposed resolution.18 7 Western conserva-
tion NGOs argued that "CITES should be used as a tool to
regulate and manage wildlife trade, not enhance it." L88 Other
NGOs contended that the proposed resolution went against
the CITES presumption "that trade in Appendix I specimens
is not beneficial."1 9
The primary problem with the draft resolution was that
it dealt in absolutes and was based on false premises not in
accord with CITES. Document 8.48 focused solely on species'
economic value and failed to account for wildlife's other val-
ues, such as aesthetic, ecological, scientific, cultural and rec-
reational uses, all mentioned in CITES' preamble.190
Although the Parties may consider a species' economic value
can be beneficial to species conservation is in accord with modern
conservation thought, such as was expressed in the 1990 IUCN
Resolution on 'Conservation of wildlife through wise use as a re-
newable natural resource.'... The Secretariat is broadly in agree-
ment with the recommendations in the draft resolution.
Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention, Comments of the Secreta-
riat on Documents Doc. 8.48 to Doc. 8.52, CITES, 8th mtg., Doc. 8.52.1 at 1
(Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Secretariat Comments]. The United States' negotiat-
ing position on Document 8.48 was to "[slupport the concept that commercial
trade can provide conservation benefits to species and ecosystems, although
economic values are no greater weight that scientific, aesthetic, cultural and
recreational values, as stated in the CITES preamble." 57 Fed. Reg. 7779
(1992).
187. Plen. 8.4, supra, note 172. See generally 57 Fed. Reg. 7779-80 (1992).
188. 57 Fed. Reg. 7780 (1992).
189. Id.
190. 57 Fed. Reg. 7779-80 (1992). See CITES, supra note 1, pmbl. Chris
Wold of the Center for International Environmental Law-U.S., articulated his
criticism in the following manner:
Proponents claim that this statement merely reaffirms paragraph 2
of the Convention's preamble, which states that wild flora and
fauna have economic value as well as aesthetic, scientific, cultural,
and recreational value. Economic value is not synonymous with
commercial trade, however.... [A] statement that trade is benefi-
cial to species listed under CITES is fundamentally at odds with
the basic purpose of CITES to prevent trade from becoming detri-
mental. Instead, CITES has developed mechanisms to facilitate
non detrimental trade, such as captive breeding and ranching.
Chris Wold, The Zimbabwe Resolutions - A Threat to CITES? at 2 (1992) (un-
published policy paper prepared for the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to CITES on behalf of conservation, environment, and animal protection




(including eco-tourism) its greatest asset, CITES does not
prefer one value over another.19'
Secondly, even if the draft resolution requirements were
satisfied, international trade, albeit beneficial, would not au-
tomatically be non-detrimental. 192 International trade could
be detrimental by stimulating illegal trade,193 regardless of
the wildlife management policies of the range state. 9 4 As
Kenya noted, the resolution "confused the issues of interna-
tional wildlife trade and national use of wildlife resources. "195
In Committee, the Parties revised the draft resolution
and the final version approved by the Parties confirmed that
"trade may be beneficial to the conservation of species and
ecosystems and/or to the development of local people when
carried out at levels, that are not detrimental to the survival
of the species in question." 96 This recognizes the potential
benefits of sustainable use 97 while acknowledging that the
principles of sustainable use may not apply equally to all spe-
cies.19 The approved resolution also recognizes that "legal
191. CITES, supra note 1, pmbl.
192. Wold, supra note 190, at 3.
193. See 57 Fed. Reg. 7779, 7780 (1992). Greenpeace, speaking for a number
of NGOs, contended that "the resolution provides a mechanism whereby detri-
mental trade could occur because some trade was beneficial." Id.
194. Wold, supra note 190, at 3-4. CITES by no means opposes sustainable
use; rather it "regulates international trade because it recognizes that interna-
tional trade often is detrimental to a species' survival." Id.
195. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172.
196. Conf. 8.3, supra note 16 (emphasis added).
197. Conf. 8.3 states in relevant parts:
RECOGNIZING that the sustainable use of wild fauna and flora
whether consumptive or non-consumptive, provides an economi-
cally competitive land use option;
BEING AWARE that, unless conservation programs take into ac-
count the needs of local people and provide incentives for sustaina-
ble use of wild fauna and flora, conversion to alternative forms of
land use may occur;
RECOGNIZING that over-utilization is detrimental to the conser-
vation of wild fauna and flora;
RECOGNIZING further that the returns from legal use may pro-
vide funds and incentives to support the management of wild fauna
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trade should not lead to increases in illegal trade anywhere
in the range" and "that the aesthetic, scientific, cultural, rec-
reational and other largely non-consumptive uses of wild
fauna and flora are also of enormous importance."199
C. Proposed Resolution 8.49: Reconsideration of
"Primarily Commercial Purposes"
To trade an Appendix I species internationally, the Sci-
entific Authorities of the exporting and importing nations
must make a finding that the trade will be "non-detrimental"
to the species.200 In addition, the Management Authority of
the importing nation must determine "that the specimen is
not to be used for primarily commercial purposes."20 1 The
second Zimbabwe Resolution, "Reconsideration of 'Primarily
Commercial Purposes,'" (Doc. 8.49) sought to bypass CITES
and allow commercial trade in Appendix I species (those in
danger of extinction) by having the "Management Authority
of the State of import interpret the term 'not to be used for
primarily commercial purposes' as being applicable only to
those cases of commercial trade which are clearly non-benefi-
cial to the species concerned."20 2
The meaning of "primarily commercial purposes" was
previously addressed at the Fifth Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties (held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1985). In
Conf. 5.10, the Parties agreed to follow a general set of princi-
ples in interpreting the term "primary commercial purposes":
1. Trade in Appendix I species must be subject to particu-
larly strict regulation and authorized only in excep-
tional circumstances;
199. Id.
200. CITES, supra note 1, art. I, paras. 2(a), (3)(a), (5)(a).
201. Id. art. I, paras. 3(c), (5)(c).
202. Doc. 8.49, supra note 174, at 5 (emphasis added). The United States
pointed out that the "benefit" of trade bears no relation to "primary commercial
purpose." 56 Fed. Reg. 67,627, 67,630-31 (1991). When an Appendix I species
is exported, the country of import determines whether it is for a "primary com-
mercial purpose." The benefit determination, that is, the maintenance of the




2. An activity can generally be described as "commercial"
if its purpose is to obtain economic benefit, including
profit (whether in cash or kind) and is directed toward
resale, exchange, provision of a service or other form of
economic use or benefit;
3. The term "commercial purposes" should be defined by
the country of import as broadly as possible so that any
transaction which is not wholly "non-commercial" will
be regarded as "commercial."203
The drafters of Doc. 8.49 considered the use and interpre-
tation of "primarily commercial purposes" to be flawed and
"prejudicial."20 4 Zimbabwe argued that CITES should not fo-
cus on commercial trade, but that it should concentrate on
sustainable use.20 5 The authors of this draft resolution be-
lieved that the all or nothing approach of the CITES appen-
dix system, allowing commercial trade in one group but not
the other, impedes the "legitimate sustainable use" of Appen-
dix I species, 20 6 and they questioned "whether there are any
203. Definition of "Primarily Commercial Purposes," CITES, 5th mtg., Conf.
5.10 (Buenos Aires, 1985) in BRAUTmAM, supra note 7, at 74 [hereinafter Conf.
5.10].
204. Doc. 8.49, supra note 174, at 1, 2. The authors of Resolution 8.49 cited
Willem Wijnstekers, former CITES Secretariat, in support of its assertion that
the term "primarily commercial purposes" is unwarranted: "'[t]he term not to
be used for primarily commercial purposes cannot be applied in general and
can, in addition, hardly be defined. One might therefore say that it should not
have been used.'" Id. at 1, (citing WILLEM WiJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION OF
CITES, 20, n.33 (1990)). The authors further noted that "the draft resolution
seeks to mitigate the prejudicial nature of the clause by suggesting that it
should only be applied when the 'commercial purposes' can be clearly demon-
strated to be non-beneficial to the species concerned." Doc. 8.49, supra note
174, at 2.
205. Doc. 8.49, supra note 174, at 1-2.
206. Id. at 2. The drafters claim that "there should be no stigma attached to
direct exploitation itself if it is sustainable and carried out within society's ac-
cepted norms of animal welfare." Id. at 1. Paragraph 10(c) of the background
document expands on the notion of unwarranted restriction:
[T]here is a tendency to assume that 'commercial' trade must al-
ways be traded on a large scale and therefore incompatible with
endangered species. The Convention tends to prejudice those suc-
cessful examples of conservation based on small-scale commercial
trade arising from sustainable use. Whilst the commercial trade
may appear insignificant on an international scale, it may be very
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conditions of endangerment of species under which all com-
mercial trade should be prohibited."20 7
This second Zimbabwe Resolution had both procedural
and substantive flaws. Procedurally, Doc. 8.49 violated
CITES 208 by attempting to amend the treaty by resolution,
which is prohibited. 20 9 Substantively, the proposed resolu-
tion ignored the Conf. 5.10 interpretation of "for primarily
commercial purposes" and directly conflicted with CITES'
main presumption that trade is suspect.
The proposed resolution attempted to shift the premise of
trade being suspect to an assumption that trade in Appendix
I species, if conducted in a sustainable manner, is beneficial
until proven otherwise.210 However, "conservation benefit is
independent of a finding of primarily commercial purpose."211
"[S]ustainable use is irrelevant to a determination of primary
commercial use because it is related to management within
the range country and is not a trade factor."212 Algeria, Ger-
important in the livelihood of rural communities and it may be the
determining factor in species survival.
Id. at 2.
207. Id.
208. The Secretariat specifically noted that the proposed resolution allowed
for commercial trade in Appendix I species which was "deliberately excluded by
the Convention in order to avoid the normal processes of commerce generating
a demand for specimens of highly endangered species that cannot be met by
legal trade." Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 2 (emphasis added).
209. CITES may only be changed by amendment which must be "adopted by
a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting" at the Conference of the
Parties. CITES, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 1.
210. Doc. 8.49, supra note 174, at 5.
211. 57 Fed. Reg. 7780 (1992). The United States made this point clear
when it explained its rationale for opposing the resolution:
Conservation benefit to the species is relevant to the Scientific Au-
thority finding of "nondetriment" under Article III, paragraph 3(a).
It is not however relevant to the Management Authority finding of
whether an Appendix I specimen is to be used for primarily com-
mercial purposes, as per Article I1, paragraph 3(c). Since the "pri-
marily commercial purposes" finding is made by the importing
country, conservation benefits which normally occur in the export-
ing country are not relevant to that finding.
Id.
212. Wold, supra note 190, at 5.
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many, Japan, Kenya,2 13 the United Kingdom, the United
States,214 Zambia and the Secretariat opposed the resolution;
Botswana and Zimbabwe withdrew the draft resolution with
the understanding that their concerns would be addressed by
the working group established to consider the Zimbabwe
Resolutions.2 15
D. Proposed Resolution 8.50: The Kyoto Criteria
The third Zimbabwe Resolution, "the Kyoto Criteria,"
(Doc. 8.50) sought to replace the Berne Criteria for listing
and delisting species in the CITES appendices. 21 6 Zimbabwe
stressed three main points: "[1] the need for more-objective
criteria for assessing the biological status of species; [2] the
need to recognize when trade is beneficial to conservation;
and [3] the need for criteria which do not make removal of
species from Appendix I more difficult than the inclusion of
species therein."217
The drafters of the Kyoto Criteria argued that the "pres-
ent state of the appendices is not enhancing conservation of
wild flora and fauna," because the appendices include far too
many species that are not necessarily "threatened by com-
mercial trade" and the Berne Criteria have failed to delete or
transfer those species which were "inappropriately listed" (es-
sentially the African elephant).218 They argued the Berne
213. Kenya charged that the real "intent of the draft resolution was to allow
trade in African elephant ivory." Plen. 8.4, supra note 172.
214. 56 Fed. Reg. 67,627, 67,630-31 (1991).
215. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172.
216. See Doc. 8.50, supra note 175. The criteria encompassed all of the theo-
ries espoused by the other Zimbabwe Resolutions, principally Doc. 8.48 and
8.49.
217. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172.
218. Doc. 8.50, supra note 175, at 13. The inappropriate listing of species in
appendices, according to Zimbabwe and its supporters, arise from a lack of ob-
jective criteria to define the term "threatened with extinction." Id. at 2.
Article I(1) of the Convention and Resolution Conf. 1.1 [the
Berne Criteria] refer to species "threatened with extinction," yet no-
where in the Resolutions of the Convention has an attempt been
made to provide an objective criteria for defining the threshold at
which a species should be considered in such a state.
This has resulted in very large numbers of species and taxa
being included in the appendices or being placed in inappropriate
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Criteria are overly prejudicial219 and that the two conditions
for deletion - (1) "positive scientific evidence" that a species
can "withstand exploitation" and (2) a "showing [of] recovery
sufficient to justify deletion 220 - are "virtually impossible to
meet" and "entail unreasonable costs for producer
appendices. The fault lies partly in the criteria being vague and
partly in the failure to apply the criteria objectively.
Recent advances in conservation biology give a basis for pre-
dicting the likelihood of extinction due to various factors. Such cri-
teria are now being applied by the Captive Breeding Specialist
Group (Foose, 1991) and will be used by IUCN in reviewing the Red
Data Books. CITES should incorporate such objective criteria in its
system of appendices.
Id.
219. The background document accompanying the Kyoto Criteria articulates
with specificity the philosophical and technical problems that the drafters of the
resolution have with the Berne Criteria:
The Berne Criteria are heavily prejudiced to listing species in
the appendices and make it extremely difficult to delete them once
listed, even where there is general agreement that they were
wrongly listed in the first place....
.... [Conf. 1.2] firstly, assumes that CITES is the only protection
afforded to species, secondly, does not envisage that there could be
any beneficial effects of trade, and, thirdly, assumes that CITES
works as it should.
CITES does not, in fact, protect, species. It controls (and may
even ban) international trade, but it has no powers to provide pro-
tection. The listing of species in Appendix I is often interpreted as
conferring a high level of protection. This interpretation is false.
There is no difference in the levels of protection between Appendix I
and Appendix II since they are not protective devices.
Doc. 8.50, supra note 175, at 5-6. The drafters' arguments are circular and
conclusory. To say that there is "no difference in the levels of protection be-
tween Appendix I and Appendix I" is simply wrong. While it may be correct to
say that a total ban on a species, such as the African elephant, may have a
detrimental impact upon local peoples who depend upon the international trade
of the species, it is another thing entirely to claim that CITES does not protect
species. Through universal action by the Parties, CITES does protect species,
albeit within the context of international trade. One reason to list the African
elephant in Appendix I in 1989 was because its listing in Appendix H failed to
curtail the rampant killing of the species. Hill, supra note 147, at 261-62; but
see Bonner, supra note 154, at 18, 30, 53. One may disagree with the motives of
the ban on ivory, but it is difficult to dispute the fact that illegal poaching has
been drastically reduced as a result. ARIcAN ELEPHANT CONSERVATION COOR-
DINATING GRoup, THx AFRICAN ELEPHANT CONSERVATION REVIEW 1 (1991).
220. Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46.
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countries." 22 1
The Kyoto Criteria proposed a list of general principles
for listing, delisting and transferring species in the appendi-
ces. Somewhat similar to the Berne Criteria, they proposed a
dual system to evaluate a species' biological and trade status
to determine its appropriate appendix listing.222 However,
unlike the Berne Criteria, the Kyoto Criteria attempted to
apply what its authors deemed a "more-objective" scientific
criteria to assess a species' biological status.223 The Kyoto
Criteria also applied the same standard when listing or de-
listing a species or transferring it to another appendix. 224
In addition, the Kyoto Criteria recommended that "look-
alike" species, mentioned in CITES Article II, "be listed in
221. Doe. 8.50, supra note 175, at 7.
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172. The Kyoto Criteria divided the probability of
a species' extinction into three categories: critical, endangered, and vulnerable.
Doe. 8.50, supra note 175, at 15. "If the probability of extinction within 10 years
is higher than 20% the species would qualify for listing in Appendix I, provided
the trade criteria are satisfied." Id. Such a determination would be made
"through population models using the best available data for the species." Id.
If there was not enough information to construct a model then the criteria re-
ferred to the Mace-Lande criteria for threatened taxa categories for mammals.
Id.
While the Kyoto Criteria criticized the Berne Criteria for being overly
stringent when it came to proving scientific evidence for downlisting a species
from Appendix I, see Doc. 8.50, supra note 175 at 7, the Secretariat pointed out
that the data required to construct the populations' models or apply the biologi-
cal criteria proposed by the resolution did not exist for the majority of species.
Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 3. The Secretariat also noted that the
resolution's reliance on the Mace-Lande criteria was misplaced. Id. The CITES
Secretariat wrote in its comment of Doc. 8.50:
[T]he "Mace-Lande criteria" were proposed by the authors primar-
ily with higher vertebrates in mind. They may not be suitable for
other taxa. Although it is stated in the draft resolution that criteria
are being developed for other taxa, there is no suggestion as to what
criteria should apply to them for the time being.
It should be stressed that Mace and Lande recommended that
their proposed criteria not be generally accepted until they had
been assessed by practical comparative application. This assess-
ment has not yet been done.
Id.
224. Doc. 8.50, supra note 175, at 15-16.
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Appendix II in preference to Appendix "225 and that "split-
listings" be avoided whenever possible. 226 When split-listing
was necessary, the Kyoto Criteria recommended listing a spe-
cies in Appendix II and not Appendix j.227 The proposed Res-
olution stated: "[i]f the global population of a species is not
threatened with extinction, the problem of geographically
separate populations or marginal populations at the edge of a
species range should be tackled through national legislation
or through listing in Appendix II."228
225. Id. at 14. In its background document, the authors explained the basis
for their proposal:
Article ][(1) of the Convention does not provide for look-alike
species to be listed in Appendix I and specifically designates Appen-
dix H for this purpose in Article H(2)(b). Yet Resolution Conf. 1.1
[the Berne Criteria] reverses this by providing for genera to be
listed in Appendix I if most of their species are threatened with
extinction and if the identification of the individual species within
the genus is difficult. Wijnstekers (1990, Notes 12a and 12b) notes
the inconsistency. This has resulted in a number of somewhat
sweeping and arbitrary inclusions of unthreatened species in Ap-
pendix I.
Id. at 3.
226. Id. at 13. A species is "split-listed" when a population in one country is
listed in Appendix I, for example, because it has been "threatened with extinc-
tion" in that state, while the same species in another state may be listed in
Appendix I because its populations are not as endangered. Id. at 2.
227. Id. at 13. The background document further states:
A disturbing trend in the Convention is the tendency to move away
from considerations of the overall status of a species and to focus on
the status of each population within a range state.
Id. at 10.
On issues of 'populations' and split-listings, if the global popu-
lation of a species is not in danger of extinction but the species is in
trouble in some Range States, it is recommended not to place the
species in Appendix I.
Id. at 8.
228. Id. at 2. (emphasis added). The background document adds:
The question has to be asked whether, if a species is secure in a
viable population in one Range State, it can in any way be consid-
ered in danger of extinction.
A further problem arises under the definition of population
when certain Range States contain marginal populations at the
edge of a species range and, from this parochial point of view, the
species is endangered. The criteria for listing species should not be
influenced by individual Parties seeking to use the Convention for
such marginal populations. Their problems can only be solved by
domestic measures and/or Appendix M listings.
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However, the Kyoto Criteria ignored the fact that spe-
cies, by definition, encompasses "species, subspecies, or geo-
graphically separate population."229 The use of the word
"global" in the Kyoto Criteria was merely an attempt to alter
the defined meaning of species and limit its application to
only one of the three defined terms. Interestingly, the origi-
nal CITES drafters contemplated a policy similar to that of
the Kyoto Criteria but rejected it.230
The proposed criteria shifted the burden of proof to delist
a species from a showing that trade was safe to a requirement
by those opposed to the downlisting that international trade
was actually harmful. The Kyoto Criteria also proposed that
a Party be required to provide "no more than a nominally
supporting statement" to downist a species listed in the ap-
pendices prior to 1992.231 Furthermore, Parties opposed to a
downlisting were obliged to draft a "proposal to justify the
retention of the species" in its present appendix.232 This re-
quirement of the Kyoto Criteria clearly sought to repeal the
precautionary principle embodied in CITES and the Berne
Criteria: that it is better to err in favor of protecting a re-
source,2 33 than to prematurely subject it to the pressures of
trade.23 4
Although the Parties and the Secretariat were opposed to
many Kyoto Criteria provisions,2 35 many Parties agreed that
Id. at 2-3.
229. CITES, supra note 1, art. I, para. a.
230. Wold, supra note 190, at 7 (citing DAvI FAvRE, RESOLUTIONS CHAL-
LENGE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES OF CITES 1 (1992) (unpublished draft)). Ac-
cording to Wold, "the word 'worldwide' modified 'threatened with extinction'" in
four of the early drafts of CITES. However, the drafters removed the word in
CITES' final draft thereby "ensur[ing] that geographically separate species
would be protected." Id. While the Secretariat agreed that split-listings should
be avoided whenever possible, it recommended that split-listing should be
"made on a case-by-case basis." Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 2.
231. Doc. 8.50, supra note 175, at 16.
232. Id. at paras. 2(C)(d)(i)-(ii).
233. Conf. 1.2, supra note 13, at 46.
234. See generally Doc. 8.50, supra note 175, at 7.
235. "There is no 'symmetry' in a process which allows only a nominal state-
ment to downlist a species and a full report simply to keep the species' present
status." Wold, supra note 190, at 8. He points out that:
All countries have an opportunity to air grievances concerning any
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the Berne Criteria need revision.236 Recognizing that they
could not effectively review the entire proposal at the 1992
Conference, the Parties assigned the Standing Committee
and the Plants and Animals Committee the task of working
with the Secretariat, IUCN and other organizations to de-
velop new criteria for listing species in the appendices to be
presented to the Parties at least 300 days before the 1994
Conference of the Parties.237 The first draft of the recommen-
dations for new criteria prepared by IUCN and submitted to
the CITES Standing Committee in March 1993 was severely
criticized by conservation groups which launched an interna-
tional drive to protest the draft proposal.238 Following com-
ments by the Parties, the IUCN draft criteria were modified
and resubmitted to the Parties.239 The proposed resolution
has been revised again and although still controversial, will
be submitted to the Conference of the Parties in Florida, in
November, 1994.
species that they believe were wrongly listed. As early as 1981, re-
gional committees were created to review trade and biological sta-
tus of species indigenous to particular regions. Unfortunately, only
two of the regions have met to consider the status of species within
their regions.
Id. at 8-9.
236. Eighth Meeting of CITES, supra note 121, at 11-12. The United States'
position was that "[tihe Berne Criteria needed to be reviewed and adapted to
address a broader array of taxa and to be more descriptive and definitive, to the
extent possible." 57 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1992).
237. Development of New Criteria for Amendments to the Appendices, CITES,
8th mtg., Comm. 8.11 (Rev.) adopted as Conf. 8.20, (Kyoto, 1992).
238. The Species Survival Network, a coalition of NGOs in Washington, D.C.
sent faxes to non-governmental organizations around the world informing them
of the new criteria and urging them to reject the proposal and submit their
comments to their governments. Facsimile in Spanish from Juan Gruss and
Tomas Waller, Traffic South America -Argentina, to Species Survival Network
(June 1993) (on file at the Pace Environmental Law Review). The IUCN Prelim-
inary Results of the Application of the Criteria to a Sample of Species, released
in July 1993, drew even more criticism. Under the proposed IUCN criteria a
number of species currently listed in Appendix I and considered by many con-
servation groups still to be endangered or threatened, would have been re-
moved to Appendix II. Mar. 4, 1994 Bolze Interview, supra note 78.
239. See Notification to the Parties Concerning Criteria for Amendment of
Appendices I and II, CITES Secretariat, No. 773 (Geneva, Oct. 15, 1993).
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E. Proposed Resolutions 8.51 & 8.52: Greater Say and
Control for Range States
The last two Zimbabwe Resolutions - "Support of
Range States for Amendments to Appendices I and I" (Doc.
8.51) and "Stricter Domestic Measures" (Doc. 8.52) - sought
to provide range states with more input and control over their
natural resources and to offset a perceived bias against sus-
tainable use.240
1. Proposed Resolution 8.51: Support of Range States
for Amendments to Appendices I and II
Proposed resolution 8.51 was divided into two parts. The
first part required the Parties to inform and consult range
states regarding any proposal to downlist a species that ex-
ists within a range state's borders.241 The second part essen-
tially provided range states with the power to veto any
proposed appendix listing affecting a species within its bor-
ders.242 Parties and NGOs alike supported efforts for a more
240. See Doc. 8.51, supra note 176; Doc. 8.52, supra note 177.
241. Doc. 8.51, supra note 176, at 3. The background document accompany-
ing the proposed resolution noted "that there is a minimum obligation to con-
sult Range States before submitting proposals which may place trade
restrictions on species occurring in their countries." Id. at 1. The CITES Secre-
tary concurred: "Since it is agreed by the Parties that peoples and states are
and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna and flora, it is impor-
tant that the range states of each species have the opportunity to influence the
process of deciding on its listing in the CITES appendices." Id.; see also Secreta-
riat Comments, supra note 186, at 5.
242. Doc. 8.51, supra note 176. The proposed resolution provided that:
a) any Range State may request a vote, which is restricted to
countries of origin of the species, immediately prior to the con-
sideration of such a proposal by the Conference of the Parties in
the appropriate Committee session;
b) the issue to be voted on is whether the Parties will consider the
proposal;
c) the vote shall be conducted without adjournment, only Parties
who are Range States shall vote, and the vote will be a secret
vote if so proposed by a Range State and seconded; and
d) if a majority of two-thirds (or, if there are fewer than three
Range States, a unanimous vote) of the Range States are op-
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formal notification and comment process.2 43 However, they
overwhelmingly opposed the second part of the resolution
(the range states veto), a direct violation of CITES.244 CITES
states that a single party veto is not permitted; a resolution is
only defeated if its sponsors withdraw it from consideration
or if a requisite two-thirds majority vote at the Conference of
the Parties is not attained.245
The Secretariat acknowledged that range states at times
had not been adequately consulted.246 Under Conf. 6.7 (Ot-
tawa, 1987), the Parties are required to communicate with
range states before imposing "stricter domestic measures" 24 7
but no formal notice requirements previously existed for pro-
posed appendix listings. Doc. 8.51 was redrafted in Commit-
tee to provide for more formal consultation procedures by the
Parties proposing to amend Appendix I or II and was adopted
by the Parties (later renumbered Plen. 8.21).248
243. 57 Fed. Reg. 7789 (1992). The United States supported the "recommen-
dation that a Party proposing to amend the Appendices notify and consult with
the range States concerned, and include any range State opinions in the propo-
sal." Id.
244. Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 5-6. CITES cannot be
amended by resolution. As previously indicated, this was not the only attempt
by the drafters of the Zimbabwe Resolutions to effectively alter CITES.
245. CITES, supra note 1, art. XV, para. 2Q).
246. Plen. 8.4, supra note 172.
247. 57 Fed. Reg. 7789.
248. CITES, 8th mtg., 9th sess., Plen. 8.9, (Kyoto, Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Plen. 8.91. The adopted resolution provided for two means of consultation.
CITES, 8th mtg., Plen. 8.21, (Kyoto, 1992) [hereinafter Plen. 8.21]. The first
option provides that Parties consult both the Management and Scientific Au-
thorities of the range states and include their opinions in its proposal. Id. The
second option does not require direct consultation with range states but re-
quires a Party to submit its proposal to the Secretariat at least eleven months
(330 days) before the upcoming Conference of the Parties for other Parties to
comment. Id. Upon receiving the proposal, the Secretariat will circulate copies
to all the Parties who in turn will "send their comments [back] to the proposing
Party in order to allow it to submit a revised proposal at least 150 days prior to
the meeting." Id. In both instances, the Parties are required to comply with
Resolution Conf. 2.17, Format for Proposals to Amend Appendix I or II, which
requires that the Parties submit biological and trade data and outline the pro-
tection status of the species at both the national and international level. For-
mat for Proposals to Amend Appendix I or II, CITES, 2d mtg., Conf. 2.17 (San
Jos6, 1979) in BRAUTiGAM, supra note 7, at 26 [hereinafter Conf. 2.17].
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2. Proposed Resolution 8.52: Domestic Measures No
Stricter Than CITES Appendices Provisions
The last of the Zimbabwe Resolutions, "Stricter Domestic
Measures" (Doc. 8.52) objected to the ability of States to go
beyond CITES and adopt legislation prohibiting the importa-
tion of species that may be traded under Appendix II or 1II.249
Botswana postulated that some consumer states used stricter
domestic measures under Article XIV "to close off markets to
range states even for species which [were] not endangered,
thus preventing any potential conservation benefits from in-
ternational trade."250 Resolution 8.52 sought to provide
range states greater control over their wildlife exports by cir-
cumventing CITES' language and recommending that the
Parties ensure that their rules and regulations regarding the
importation of species were not "more or less restrictive than
the existing provisions of CITES."251
However, "the draft resolution conflict[ed] with the text
of the Convention, by proposing to restrict a right which the
Convention assures to the Parties." 252 CITES states:
1. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no
way affect the right of Parties to adopt:
249. Doc. 8.52, supra note 177, at 5. See CITES, supra note 1, art. XIV, para.
1.
250. CITES, 8th mtg., 11th sess., Comm. II 8.11 (Kyoto, Mar. 10, 1992)
[hereinafter Comm. 118.111. See also Eighth Meeting of CITES, supra note 121,
at 13. The background document accompanying the proposed resolution fur-
ther articulated the drafters' concern that stricter domestic legislation will in-
hibit sustainable use management practices of wildlife.
Management of wildlife in some producer countries is now rec-
ognized as a valid form of land use and, because it is profitable, it is
leading to greater tracts of land under wildlife. For such positive
developments to continue, international trade measures are re-
quired which treat wildlife products no differently than those do-
mestic livestock Prejudice against the trade in products of wildlife
will drive land out of wildlife production. Stricter domestic legisla-
tion in importing countries, underpinned by the assumption that
the additional protection is enhancing conservation, is likely to pro-
duce the opposite effect.
Doc. 8.52, supra note 177, at 3.
251. Doc. 8.52, supra note 177, at 5.
252. Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 6.
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(a) stricter domestic measures regarding the condi-
tions for trade, taking, possession or transport of speci-
mens of species included in Appendices I, II and III, or
the complete prohibition thereof; or
(b) domestic measures restricting or prohibiting
trade, taking, possession or transport of species not in-
cluded in Appendices I, II, III.253
The background document accompanying Resolution 8.52
recognized that CITES Article XIV gives Parties the right to
adopt stricter domestic trade regulations. 254 Yet proponents
of the resolution interpreted Article XIV simply to mean "that
a Range State was entitled to afford species within its coun-
try greater legal protection than that provided by CITES."255
They argued that the "provision has been used more by im-
porting countries to restrict trade than it has by Range States
for protection purposes."256 The Secretariat again refuted the
253. CITES, supra note 1, art. XIV, paras. 1(a), (b). The Secretariat also
noted that the IUCN Environmental Law Center had already provided two
legal opinions on the interpretation of Article XIV para. 1 which had been dis-
tributed to all the Parties (Technical Committee Document Doc. TEC. 2.5 and
Notification to the Parties No. 611, Oct. 31, 1990). Secretariat Comments, supra
note 186, at 6.
254. Doc. 8.52, supra note 177, at 1. Proponents of Resolution 8.52 did not
object to stricter domestic measures per se when "a Party ha[d] reason to be-
lieve that a species is being traded illegally" as recommended by Resolution
Conf. 2.6 (b). Id. They did, however, question Resolution Conf 2.6 (a) which
advises that stricter domestic measures be considered when "an Appendix II or
I species is being traded in a manner detrimental to the survival of that spe-
cies." Id. Proponents seemed to view illegal trade and unsustainable use as
two distinct and unrelated problems:
[If a] species is being exploited unsustainably it is unlikely that
stricter domestic measures imposed by an importing country will
correct the problem. If the Scientific and Management Authorities
in an importing state are better able to determine that a species is
being exploited unsustainably in a Range State than its own Scien-
tific and Management Authorities then they have a moral responsi-




256. Id. An example of stricter measures can be seen in the case of the
United States, which lists the Nile Crocodile (except for populations from
Zimbabwe), and Yacare Caiman as "endangered" under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 (ESA). 55 Fed Reg. 43,387 (1990). Yacare Caiman is listed in
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drafters' arguments, claiming: "There is no evident basis for
the suggestion in the draft resolution that Article XIV(1) was
intended to apply primarily to countries of origin of CITES-
listed species."257 The merits of Resolution 8.52 were never
debated as Botswana withdrew the resolution from consider-
ation upon its introduction in Committee.258
F. The Debate Over Split-Listing the African Elephant in
Appendices I and II
While the drafters (minus Zambia) argued for the
Zimbabwe Resolutions, their sustainable use ideologies faced
a more immediate test in the efforts to downlist the African
elephant to Appendix II. The primary focus of the debate was
whether downlisting the African elephant to Appendix II and
the resumption of international trade in ivory would be sus-
tainable. In international commercial trade, sustainability
must be viewed from a broad international perspective and
must account not only for the impact on local ecologies and
Appendix II and the Nile Crocodile is listed in Appendix I except where it is
permitted to be traded under the ranching programs (Conf. 3.15) and export
quotas (Conf. 7.14). 56 Fed. Reg. 49,708, 49,720-21 (1991). The U.S. is consid-
ering downlisting both species from endangered to threatened under the ESA
which would greatly increase the trade for those species. 55 Fed Reg. 43,387-88
(1990). The Crocodile Specialist Group and TRAFFIC strongly support the de-
listing of the species. CSG Steering Comm. Aug. 1992 Minutes, supra note 92,
at 12.
257. Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 6. A plain reading of Article
XIV, para. 1 indicates that the right to adopt stricter domestic measures fell
equally on exporting as well as importing nations. Chris Wold pointed out the
importance of importing nations' ability to act independently:
If passed, this proposal would seriously limit importing coun-
tries' ability to protect species. It would ensure that nonrange
countries could not impose precisely the type of unilateral import
bans that reduced the ivory trade and helped place the elephant on
Appendix I. Nor will importing countries be able to require import
permits for Appendix I1 species. Both these measures have demon-
strated the ability of nonrange countries to protect species and ef-
fect unsustainable exploitation in exporting countries. Moreover,
importing countries likely will not be able to make "no detriment"
findings inconsistent with those of the range country, because they
will be limited by the law of range states.
Wold, supra note 190, at 11 (citations omitted).
258. Comm. II 8.11, supra note 250.
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targeted populations, but also for the effect that a use will
have on similar or different populations elsewhere. The con-
cept put forth by the Zimbabwe Resolutions that sustainable
use of a species is purely a local issue was rejected by the
Parties.
1. The Sustainable Use of the African Elephant
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe introduced a
joint proposal before Committee I to downlist their (Lox-
odonta africana) elephant populations to Appendix II. The
Minister of Commerce and Industry of Botswana said that
his country's concern was not trading ivory per se, but was
with environmental protection and ecologically sustainable
development. 25 9 He noted that:
Appendix II listing is a case for sustainable use of whole
elephants or products, not just ivory. The current Appen-
dix I listing for the African elephant under CITES blocks
us from following our strategy, since our domestic market
is potentially very small. It is primarily for this reason
that Botswana seeks the restoration of its elephant popula-
tion to Appendix II.260
Zimbabwe reiterated the benefits of wildlife sustainable use
and its vital importance to rural communities as an alterna-
259. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 1; Comm. 1 8.9, supra note 179.
260. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 1. The Minister from Botswana
further outlined the state of its African elephant populations:
Distinguished delegates, Botswana has a significant population of
the African elephant in its care. Scientifically conducted aerial
surveys [unintelligible] indicate that in 1991 Botswana had some
60,000 elephants occupying up to 25,000 square kilometers. The
same work has revealed that during the dry season, 75% of that
population concentrate themselves on some 16% of the range,
around a few northern waterways. I would welcome anyone who
wants to come and check these figures for themselves. Botswana's
elephant population now poses a potential risk to the woodlands
and the existence of other wildlife species in its range.... Bot-
swana has a comprehensive national conservation strategy. Some
17% of Botswana is set aside for national parks and a further 23%
for wildlife management areas.
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tive to subsistence agriculture,261 arguing that
[t]he trade ban initiated by CITES in 1989 did not accom-
modate the fact that not all African elephant populations
were in crisis .... The ban may seem to have addressed
some short-term problems in those countries where ele-
phants were declining, [b]ut it has also threatened the
demonstrated successes in our countries, which now con-
tain one-quarter of the elephants in Africa.262
As required under Resolution Conf. 7.9 (the elephant
downlisting resolution), a Panel of Experts reviewed the sci-
entific evidence of the numbers and trends of elephants in
each country, the conservation and management practices
employed and the adequacy of the trade controls.263 The
Panel's report questioned "the viability of elephant popula-
tions in Namibia and Malawi" and observed a need for im-
proved "trade controls."2 64 However, the panel concluded
261. Comm. 18.9, supra note 179. Zimbabwe's Minister of Environment and
Tourism:
In many areas, we are watching a transition from subsistence
agriculture to wildlife producer communities. We are also planning
a new coalition between the rural wildlife producers and national
wildlife management authorities. We are planning to have pro-
gress in turning a conflict situation into one where wildlife is now
an asset. However, for this position of positive development to con-
tinue, the full economic value of wildlife must be realized, including
any advantages offered by international cooperation. In short,
wildlife must be enabled to secure its own survival through sustain-
able utilization.
Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 2-3.
262. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 2.
263. See generally Conf. 7.9, supra note 144, at 97-98. In considering a
downlisting proposal, the Panel must address four factors:
i) whether total levels of offtake from both legal and illegal killing
are sustainable;
ii) whether control of ivory stocks is adequate to prevent the mix-
ing of legal and illegal ivory;
iii) whether law enforcement is effective; and
iv) whether enforcement controls are sufficient to ensure that no
significant amounts of ivory taken or traded illegally from
other countries are traded within or through the territory of
the affected range state ....
Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
264. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 3.
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"that Botswana and Zimbabwe met the criteria for a transfer
of their elephant populations to Appendix II."265
2. Compromises Offered
Recognizing the sensitivity of the issue, Zimbabwe,
speaking for the group of southern African nations, offered as
a measure of good faith, a "self imposed moratorium on raw
ivory sales" until the necessary methods of control had been
addressed "both in southern Africa and in the importing
countries."266 In addition, Zimbabwe noted the advances it
believed had been made in the area of monitoring and trade
control:
In southern Africa, we have examined our joint needs
for wildlife management. This includes cooperation in re-
search, management, law enforcement and marketing.
Through the creation of the central marketing system and
other coordinated activities we have achieved a remarka-
ble level of regional cooperation in wildlife management in
southern Africa, which we value very highly. This is why
we have submitted our joint proposal. We have no inten-
tion of abandoning this unity, nor do we have any intention
of putting in place a system of trading which will jeopard-
ize the remainder of Africa's elephants. 267
However, Parties still opposed the downlisting and Bot-
swana, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe sought a further
compromise.2 68 On behalf of the group, Malawi submitted a
revision to the original downlisting proposals which called
for:
1. A mandatory moratorium on "all ivory except hunting
trophies and local sales of worked ivory;"
2. The establishment of a working group which would ad-
265. Eighth Meeting of CITES, supra note 121, at 13.
266. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 3. The Summary Report of the
Committee I Meeting, however, makes it appear as though only Zimbabwe
would observe a moratorium. See CITES, 8th mtg., 4th sess., Comm. 1 8.4 (Ky-
oto, Mar. 5, 1992).
267. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 3.
268. Hemley, Endangered Treaty, supra note 15, at 2.
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dress transit and border controls and draft a proposal
to be submitted to the next Conference of the Parties
concerning the reopening of "limited trade in ivory
from SACIM under strictly controlled conditions;"
3. Review by the Parties of the working group's proposal
at the following Conference with the understanding
that the elephant would be returned to Appendix I
should the proposal fail;
4. All four countries to be treated as one unit while the
working group would "establish appropriate mecha-
nisms to allow the different treatment of each member
state within an Appendix II listing;"
5. Initially limiting commercial trade in ivory to specified
importing countries that prohibit re-export.269
Malawi urged approval of the compromise resolution,
stating that the moratorium would "be lifted very carefully,
very slowly, step by step," so the process could be monitored
and suspended if problems arose.270 "We do not prefer to
leave Kyoto with our elephants still on Appendix I with our
reservations in place. We feel that our proposal, as amended,
is better for elephants, better for people, better for conserva-
tion, and better for CITES."2 71
The Secretariat considered Botswana and Zimbabwe to
have met the biological criteria and noted that under the new
proposal "the criteria on ivory trade controls were not rele-
vant ... "272 Switzerland also supported the compromise2 73
269. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 4.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Comm. 1 8.9, supra note 179, at 2.
273. Switzerland's delegate, Peter Dollinger, in supporting the resolution ex-
pressed his country's frustration with what he termed "the lack of consistency"
demonstrated by the Parties to the Conference. Elephant Debate, supra note
178, at 6. He went on to say:
Very often we behave, in fact, rather like some local rabbit-breed-
ers' association than like a Conference made up of responsible rep-
resentatives of sovereign nations.... [Tihis Conference accepted
Resolution Conf. 7.9, by which a split-listing of the African elephant
was accepted in principle. This decision was taken by a vast major-
ity of the Conference.... By Resolution Conf. 7.9, a Panel of Ex-
perts was established. It is disturbing to note that many Parties
have made up their minds before they were in possession of the
19941 365
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and, recognizing the differences between the four countries,
proposed that each one be considered separately.27 4
3. Opposition to the Downlisting Due to Biological and
Enforcement Factors
According to TRAFFIC's account of the Conference, com-
promise efforts came too late.275 Despite the changes offered,
a majority of the Parties, including other African range
states, believed that it was simply too soon to consider down-
listing any African elephant populations. Contrary to the
Secretariat's statements, the Parties did consider the issue of
trade controls to be of vital importance and also questioned
the delisting on biological grounds.27 6 Perhaps Zambia,
which withdrew its co-sponsorship of the dowlisting propo-
sal, best expressed the sentiments of the majority of Parties
in opposition to the resolution:
(1) elephant populations in the subregion remained far
lower than they had been ten or fifteen years ago and that
the environment was still able to handle an increase;
(2) controls were not in place to prevent illegal trade;277
Panel of Experts' report.... [The proponents, following the Secre-
tariat's recommendation, have amended their proposal in the sense
that no commercial trade in ivory will take place until the next
meeting of the Conference of the Parties. Switzerland, as the De-
pository Government, wishes to be consistent, wishes to be honest
towards the range states concerned. This delegation will, therefore,
support the proposal with regard to those populations meeting the
biological criteria.
Id.
274. Id. at 7. See also Comm. 1 8.9, supra note 179.
275. Hemley, Endangered Treaty, supra note 15, at 2.
276. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 5-6; but see Eighth Meeting of
CITES, supra note 121, at 13 ("[Flew questioned the evidence that populations
were locally large and well-managed").
277. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 5. Zambia added:
There are no controls in all of the countries in the subregion today
that can take care of the illegal trade in elephant ivory and prod-
ucts. This includes South Africa, which has one of the most sophis-
ticated police networks, law enforcement networks in the region.
Indeed, it is the biggest transit route, as Africa exists today, for
ivory. How, then, can we turn around and say, we in Zambia, with
meager resources, Zimbabwe, these other countries, have the re-
sources to take care of the control of trade controls.
66http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/12
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(3) virtually no cooperation existed in the area of enforce-
ment, and what little there was, occurred on an ad hoc ba-
sis and lacked the backing of an international treaty or
accord;278
(4) government officials were inadequately trained and
lacked the ability "to effectively monitor ... trade in the
region;"279 and
(5) many of the elephants claimed by Zimbabwe also be-
longed to Zambia as populations freely crossed the borders
of the two countries.280
Other countries such as Tanzania,281 the United King-
Id. at 5-6.
278. Id. at 6. Israel pointed to the lack of an international accord to address
the management of migratory elephant populations.
When biologically discrete wildlife populations straddle interna-
tional frontiers elsewhere in the world, the states involved nor-
mally agree to bilateral or multilateral treaties on common
conservation and management moves. There are numerous Euro-
pean accords of this nature; in North America there are formal
agreements on migratory birds, fish, marine mammals, polar bears,
and even a caribou herd. In South America the vicuna is subject to
joint conservation and management under the terms of the La Paz
Convention. We are unaware of any analogous agreement in south-
ern Africa to share responsibility for conservation and management
of biologically discrete elephant populations which traverse na-
tional frohtiers. The only agreement we are aware of is a market-
ing agreement, SACIM, which does not address the conservation
and management of live elephants.
Id. at 11.
279. Id. at 6.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 7. Tanzania not only questioned the ability to control trade but
also questioned the motivation to downlist the elephant:
The delegates of the four countries have spoken of good will
when they came to us .... Mr. Chairman, I must say that our
colleagues have presented their proposal from outside the Conven-
tion. All of them have not renounced the reservations they entered
following of African elephant to Appendix I in 1989. The clear
message that the rest of the African elephant range states are get-
ting is to downlist a species to allow SACIM to trade in the four
countries' elephants as well as ours. In the latest [reports] that we
have studied, the proponents will admit that there are no controls
in place to stop the flow of ivory into any illegal trade which may be
established as a result of the downlisting.
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dom, 2 2 and the United States reiterated their apprehension
over the level of controls in place to prevent illegal trade.28 3
Tanzania feared that downlisting the African elephant to Ap-
pendix II would ultimately force it "to spend resources, and
much time and energy, [on] anti-poaching and law enforce-
ment instead of deliberating on the development of the wild-
life sector meaningful national development."28 4 Tanzania
and other nations were also concerned with the message that
downlisting the elephant would send to poachers, even if the
ivory trade moratorium remained in place.285 Tanzania
warned:
Mr. Chairman, the poachers in Africa are waiting for a
282. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 8. The United Kingdom praised
efforts to improve law enforcement but maintained that controls were inade-
quate to allow the resumption of trade in ivory:
We have examined all the available evidence, and in particular
the Panel of Experts' reports, which make clear that in some places
excellent law enforcement and management procedures have been
established, and the countries concerned should be proud of their
efforts. They offer an example to all. But the Panel also made clear
that this was not so in other countries, and, most critically, the
Panel found continuing illegal trade everywhere in southern Africa;
and the Panel concluded that evidence exists that ivory has been
and continues to be shipped through all the SACIM countries for
[sic] neighboring states. And, further, the Panel commented on the
problems of marketing [unintelligible] to prevent poached and le-
gally-taken tusks from being mixed. And, as the Panel of Experts
concluded, Botswana is the country hosting the Southern African
Center for Ivory Marketing, SACIM, where according to the Panel,
the system of control of raw ivory is inherently unsound and largely
ignored. And we therefore remain unconvinced that any country
can prevent the mixing of legal and illegal ivory.
Id. at 8.
283. Id. at 12.
284. Id. at 7.
285. Id. at 9. The United Kingdom feared that even trade in elephant prod-
ucts would have a detrimental impact upon the species:
[W]e further believe that to allow trade in other elephant products
will inevitably be seen by some as a rehearsal for the resumption of
trade in ivory. To allow trade at this moment in other elephant
products would send all of the wrong signals to the poachers. It
could only encourage further poaching and stockpiling of ivory, and
would jeopardize the progress that has been made under the trade





message from us. If they should get the message that
trade will continue, they will start poaching before we
leave Kyoto. If we make the mistake of downlisting any
elephant population from Appendix I to H, the 8th Confer-
ence of the Parties will be remembered as having sen-
tenced both the African elephant, and the other species
that rely on the elephant, to death.28 6
The fear over resumed poaching (which had almost entirely
ceased) with the African elephant's listing in Appendix II was
not unwarranted. Several countries reported a rise in poach-
ing during the Kyoto conference due in part to the belief that
trade in ivory would soon resume.28 7 Kenya, which derives
considerable revenues from eco-tourism based largely on the
healthy existence of its elephant populations, 288 stressed that
"any reopening of any form of trade" in ivory would "lead to
disaster."28 9 Kenya's delegate, Richard Leakey, whose con-
servation ideologies differ considerably from those expressed
by Zimbabwe, 290 urged proponents of the resolution not to
view the effort to keep the African elephant in Appendix I as
"a foreign initiative" and requested, "for the sake of unity,"
that the proposal be withdrawn.2 91
286. Id. at 7.
287. Orenstein Interview, supra note 5.
288. Id.
289. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 10.
290. Michael Satchell, Wildlife's Last Chance, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 68.
291. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 10. Leakey's full comments follow:
First, I would like to appeal to our colleagues from the proponent
countries not to continue to believe that this initiative to keep ele-
phants on Appendix I is a foreign initiative. It is an African con-
cern, and we as Africans in the majority at this meeting truly and
firmly believe that course of action is the correct action. To say that
we are being manipulated externally is an insult to our intelligence.
Secondly, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is important to make it
clear that many countries have nothing fundamentally against the
principle of wildlife utilization.
Nonetheless, the very reasons that were there for the decision
to put elephants on Appendix I remain today. To talk of a morato-
rium for a period of two years or three years is inappropriate. Let
us speak clearly: there should be no ivory trade, period. If at some
future date there are adequate controls to cover the international
trade in ivory, the matter can be reconsidered; but at the moment,
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Faced with insurmountable opposition, Botswana reluc-
tantly withdrew the proposal.292 South Africa also withdrew
its proposal to downlist its elephant populations after Parties
aired similar concerns over the enforcement implications. 293
4. The African Elephant, Split-Listing & Sustainable
Use
Was CITES' integrity jeopardized by the vote not to de-
there simply are not those controls in place, and any reopening of
any form of trade, or any message that suggests that trade will be
reopened in the foreseeable future, will lead to a disaster for those
countries.
Id.
292. Id. at 13. Ginette Hemley, in describing the Conference claimed that
"industrialized nations" managed to prevent any further debate on the issue.
Hemley, Endangered Treaty, supra note 15, at 2. However, a review of the
transcript of the debate over the resolution indicates otherwise. Not only did
"industrialized nations" not prevent debate but, as Richard Leakey of Kenya
noted, a majority of the opposition to the downlisting came from African na-
tions. Elephant Debate, supra, note 178, at 10.
293. Hemley, Endangered Treaty, supra note 15, at 13. Despite the reasons
cited by opponents of the resolution, the Botswana delegation could not hide its
frustration and anger with the Parties. Elephant Debate, supra note 178, at 13.
The Minister of Commerce and Industry of Botswana spoke on behalf the South
African nations that had submitted the Zimbabwe Resolutions.
We are indeed extremely perplexed. In 1989, when the entire ele-
phant population of Africa was listed in Appendix I of CITES, the
Parties simultaneously adopted a set of criteria and procedures for
transferring that portion, those elephant populations which clearly
did not belong on Appendix I. We assume that this was because the
Parties were not entirely comfortable with their decision. We have
now complied with those criteria, submitted proposals based on
those criteria, satisfied those criteria and, prior to this meeting, ex-
pected to have our elephant transferred back to Appendix H accord-
ing to those criteria. It seems to us that the goalposts have been
moved and this brings into doubt the integrity, objectives and long-
term motives of CITES....
.. The question which remains is what will we do next? The
choice which the Parties have effectively made is to reject an offer of
a continued moratorium (which belies the assertion that we are
selfish) and to accept the risk that we will not legally trade in ivory
outside the CITES umbrella. Mr. Chairman, it is no wonder that
we are puzzled and saddened.
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list select African elephant populations?294 Ironically, the de-
cision not to downlist the African elephant symbolized
everything that the Zimbabwe Resolutions sought to change
in the CITES system - perceived indifference to sustainable
use, the weight given commercial versus non-commercial
trade, the consideration of international enforcement meas-
ures, and the potential effects on illegal trade as factors to
determine whether to downlist a species.
CITES has always considered the effect that listing, de-
listing, or, as in the case of the African elephant, split-listing
will have on remaining populations or other species within
the genus. The Berne Criteria acknowledge that non-endan-
gered species may be listed on Appendix I or II if they are
difficult to distinguish from taxa endangered or threatened
with extinction.295 Similarity of appearance, geography, the
migratory nature of a species, product demand and the level
of enforcement controls are issues which affect the decision
whether to split-list a species. The Secretariat, in response to
proposed resolution 8.50 (the Kyoto Criteria), recommended
that three factors be considered by the Parties in determining
whether to split-list a species:
[1] the biological status of each population of the species
concerned;
[2] the potential benefits of permitting trade in specimens
from the healthy populations and the potential disad-
294. Ginette Hemley, Director of TRAFFIC U.S._A characterized the decision
as being "political expediency rather than practical conservation." Hemley, En-
dangered Treaty, supra note 15, at 1.
295. Conf. 1.1, supra note 13, at 8, states:
Genera should be listed if most of their species are threatened
with extinction and if identification of individual species within the
genus is difficult. The same should apply to the listing of any
smaller taxa within larger ones.
If most of the smaller taxa are not threatened but identification
of individual species is difficult, the entire larger taxon should be
placed on Appendix 11.
Taxa listed in Appendix I, because of difficulty in separating
them from endangered forms within the same taxa should be anno-
tated as such in the appendix.
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vantages to these populations if they are included in
Appendix I; and
[3] the potential enforcement problems, to the detriment
of the endangered populations, if only the latter were
to be included in Appendix J.296
While Parties questioned the biological status of some el-
ephant populations concerned and the benefits of allowing
even non-ivory trade, the issue of "law enforcement"297 - the
prevention of poaching and the control of cross boarder smug-
gling - led the Parties to reject the downlisting proposals.
The Parties opposed to the downlisting concluded that propo-
nents had not met their burden of proof under Conf. 7.9 and
had failed to show that the "total levels of offtake from both
legal and illegal killing are sustainable .... ,,298 Normally, if
enforcement controls are sufficient such that trade in one
population of a species does not affect another, then split-list-
ing is possible.299 However, even if a species is harvested
sustainably and effective control measures exist within the
range state, if international trade has the effect of stimulat-
ing illegal poaching and trade in other countries, then the use
of the natural resource, on the whole, is technically unsus-
tainable. Such was the case with-the African elephant.
CITES fumdamentally requires that "international coop-
eration is essential for the protection of certain species ...
against over-exploitation through international trade."300
Cooperation at times calls for trade restrictions in the best
interests of an entire species. However, uniformly listing an
296. Secretariat Comments, supra note 186, at 2.
297. See Conf. 7.9, supra note 144, at 99. Under Conf. 7.9, Parties must
demonstrate that "law enforcement is effective" and "enforcement controls are
sufficient to ensure that no significant amounts of ivory taken or traded illegally
from other countries are traded within or through the territory of the affected
range state ...." Id. (emphasis added).
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. As already seen in the ranching resolution, CITES recognizes that "the
populations of species included in Appendix I may vary between the countries
in which they occur in the degree to which they are endangered ...." Conf.
3.15, supra note 104, at 64. Ranching is a good example of where split-listing is
allowed, with some population of species listed on Appendix I and others on
Appendix II.
300. CITES, supra note 1, pmbl.
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entire species on Appendix I and restricting its commercial
trade poses political and economic problems. While critics
ask whether it is fair that a few nations are denied the oppor-
tunity to benefit economically from their natural resources
while other states benefit from the same type of resource,301
one must also ask if it is fair that other range states incur the
costs of preventing poaching and illegal trade within their
borders for the sake of allowing a few select states to trade in
ivory. The real question is: whose ox gets gored? One must
question the cost-benefit of controlled ivory trade in light of
pressures from poaching, high cost of governmental controls
and the low reproductive rate of the elephant.3 0 2 Given the
failed efforts to control poaching and past illegal ivory trade
practices, it is questionable if any control measures are suffi-
cient for authorized international ivory trade to ever be a sus-
tainable and properly controlled enterprise.
VI. The Future of Commercial Sustainable Use
Within CITES
The Parties' debate over sustainable use of fauna and
flora in international trade will likely continue for some time.
CITES resolutions on captive breeding, ranching and quotas
demonstrate the willingness of Parties to allow commercial
sustainable use of Appendix I species under limited and con-
trolled circumstances. The international commercial use of
Appendix II species by its very definition should always be
sustainable if conducted in accord with CITES Article IV
para. 3. However, the sustainable commercial use of Appen-
dix II species is not always achieved.
The debate over downlisting the African elephant shows
that many factors must be considered when determining the
sustainability of international commercial use of fauna and
301. When the ivory ban was first proposed in 1989, David Pearce, a profes-
sor of environmental economics in London and a member of the Ivory Trade
Review Group, who opposed the ban, considered "depriving African countries of
ivory sales to be equivalent to levying a $50 million tax on their governments."
Bonner, supra note 154, at 17, 52. Pearce recommended that the African na-
tions be compensated $100 million a year for their losses. Id.
302. Hill, supra note 147, at 263-64.
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flora. The next section illustrates the difficulties in imple-
menting international commercial sustainable use and some
of the limitations of sustainable use as a conservation tool.
This section also examines the international crocodilian skin
trade including the success of sustainable use of some species
(primarily from ranching) and the inability of CITES to pre-
vent and curtail the unsustainable caiman skin trade. As
this checkered past shows, until the Parties improve CITES
compliance, international commercial sustainable use will be
difficult to achieve.
A. The International Commercial Sustainable Use of
Fauna and Flora & the Need for Accurate Scientific
Data and Trade Controls
There are few examples in which sustainable use of
fauna and flora (consumptive and non-consumptive uses) has
been successfully employed. 303 Nevertheless, many conserva-
tionists and wildlife managers have recognized and accepted
sustainable use as a conservation tool and its application will
certainly increase. While it can provide conservation incen-
tives, sustainable use, in and of itself, is by no means the
cure-all for conservation's ills.
303. "It is easy to agree with the principle of sustainable use in the abstract.
It is much more difficult to implement it in the real world where greed, igno-
rance and the general pressures of progress impede wildlife management
plans." Favre, Precautionary Tale, supra note 50, at 1. For different examples
and case studies of the sustainable use of fauna and flora see generally NEo-
TROPICAL WILDLIFE USE (John G. Robinson & Kent H. Redford eds., 1991) (ex-
ploring subsistence hunting, market hunting and collecting, wildlife farming
and ranching, sport hunting, and commercial uses of wildlife); FrrZGERALD,
supra note 1, at 317 (cites crocodile raising in Papua, New Guinea and eco-
tourism involving Rwanda's mountain gorilla as two examples of how economic
incentives and sustainable use are being applied to protect species from exter-
nal pressures); Goldstein, supra note 69, at 985 (points to the sustainable use of
crocodiles in Papua, New Guinea, along with butterfly farming and seabirds
farming in Iceland); Christin and Robert Prescott-Allen, Wildlife and Rural De-
velopment: Case Studies in Sustainable Rural Development Using Native Bio-
logical Diversity, (Jan. 1992) (case studies include butterfly and crocodile
rearing in Papua, New Guinea, the Vicufla in Peru, snake venom production in
India, and handmade paper production and community forestry in Nepal).
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1. Species Applicability & The Limitations on the
Conservation Benefits of Sustainable Use
The applicability and success of sustainable use, particu-
larly for commercial purposes, depends largely on the species
and its habitat.30 4 Not all species are created equally.
"Every species has different pressures on it.... Sustainable
use is more likely where you have a high biological poten-
tial."30 5 For example, species "with large home ranges, long
life spans, and [a] low recruitment rate will be least likely to
be able to sustain a commercial offtake."30 6 "Such species are
often the most desirable species in trade; elephants, rhinos,
and many parrots provide examples."30 7 However, many of
the most endangered species do not fit into this category, and
their protection is often overshadowed by species that attract
commercial interest.3 08 In its 1992 Action Plan, the CSG ad-
dressed some of the limitations of sustainable use as a means
of conservation:
Although the development of [sustainable use] projects is
of considerable importance for a number of crocodilians,
and will take on an increasingly large role in years to
come, significantly more emphasis needs to be placed now
on the implementation of recovery programs for the truly
endangered crocodilians for which commercial utilization
is not an immediate option and for some never will be.3 0 9
It is important to reiterate that sustainable use of fauna and
flora need not always be economic in nature; it can be for
either consumptive or non-consumptive purposes. A species
may be used in a sustainable manner for food consumption,
medical purposes, or for its aesthetic or recreational value in
the form of eco-tourism (an economic but non-consumptive
use).
304. JONATHAN FISHER Carving Up Tomorrow's Planet, Interview with John
G. Robinson, hT'L WiLDLwE (Jan/Feb. 1994) at 35.
305. Id.
306. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 6.
307. Id.
308. THORBJARNARSON, ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 7.
309. Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Requirements for the Sustainable Use of Fauna
and Flora
"Even if some uses are conceivably compatible with con-
servation, the question of appropriate management re-
mains."310 The CSG actively incorporates sustainable use of
crocodilians for commercial purposes as a means of conserva-
tion and agrees that sustainable use must be "carefully
planned and implemented" to be successful. 311 IUCN's Draft
Criteria for the Ecological Sustainability of Non-Consump-
tive and Consumptive Uses of Wild Species set out five re-
quirements for making uses sustainable:
[1] Information on the target population and its associ-
ated ecosystems, on current and proposed uses, and on so-
cial and economic factors affecting them;
[2] A management system that can respond rapidly to
changing conditions or better information;
[3] A supportive and effective legal framework;
[4] Social or economic incentives for the people living
with the target population or its supporting ecosystems to
conserve them;
[5] Acceptance of the precautionary principle and safe-
guards to ensure the survival of wild species, populations
and supporting ecosystems.312
The issue of scientific data is of primary importance in
the sustainable use debate. Sustainable use "requires accu-
rate, up-to-date and reliable baseline data on the current pop-
ulation, natural mortality, age structure, recruitment rate,
population trends and fluctuations and other aspects of the
species in question"3 13 before determining the appropriate
level of use. Information is needed for both the targeted pop-
ulation and its associated ecosystem. Determining what level
of proof is necessary to justify a species' use and the level at
310. Robinson and Redford, supra note 60, at 3. See also Robinson, supra
note 57, at 25-26; Donald Ludwig et al., Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and
Conservation: Lessons from History, 260 SCIENCE 17 (Apr. 2, 1993).
311. THORJARNARSON, ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 4.
312. DRAr GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at para. 29.
313. Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 6.
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which the use will be sustainable is difficult. Views differ on
the need for conservation and the validity of scientific studies
which are not always completely accurate or conclusive.
Commercial fishing is a classic example of over-exploita-
tion despite the potential extent of species renewability. 314
Approximately 45 percent of the fish populations in the
United States and 59 percent in European waters are deemed
to be overutlized.3 15 There are often conflicting scientific
views over a system's vulnerability, e.g., the California sar-
dine and the Canadian codfish.3 16 Even when strong scien-
tific evidence exists, it does not necessarily assure a
resource's proper management: "[m]any practices continue
even in cases where there is abundant scientific evidence that
they are ultimately destructive." 17
314. A. A. Rosenberg et al., Achieving Sustainable Use of Renewable Re-
sources, 262 ScIENCE 828 (Nov. 5, 1993). See also Robinson, supra note 57, at
25-26. John Robinson remarks in his article on Sustainable Living and the
Loss of Biodiversity:
The history of natural resource use in modern times bears wit-
ness to the frequency that resource potential and human needs are
incompatible. Even systems like marine fisheries, which are highly
productive and heavily managed, have been consistently exploited,
and stocks of many economically important species are today highly
precarious.
Id. (citations omitted).
315. Rosenberg et al., supra note 314, at 828.
316. William M Stevens, Biologists Fear Sustainable Yield Is Unsustainable
Idea, N.Y. Tndns, Apr. 20, 1993 at C4; Ludwig et al., supra note 310, at 17.
317. Ludwig et al., supra note 310, at 36; Rosenberg et al., supra note 314, at
828. "[Olverexploitation often results from the failure of resource managers to
follow scientific advice." Id. Evidence is unfolding that indicates that Russia
reported only half the number of whales that it actually killed between the
1960's and 1980's. Peter James Spielmann, Soviets Lied For Years About Whale
IGllings, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 21, 1994, at A8. Minutes obtained by the Humane
Society International from a meeting of Zimbabwe's National Parks and Wild-
life Management Department on June 13, 1990, indicate that ground staff and
game wardens disputed the Department's 1988 elephant population estimates
and allegations of habitat damage by elephant populations and objected to fur-
ther culling. C. Tshuma, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Manage-
ment, Minutes of the Management Meeting, June 13, 1990, in TERESA M.
TELECKY & DAVID K WmLs, ZinmAwE: DRrViNG WMDLnE TO EXTnCTION, at
Annex II (Oct. 12, 1993) (on file with the Pace Environmental Law Review). The
Humane Society charges that "[ellephant populations sizes are grossly over-
stated by the Zimbabwe government to justify killing elephants for economic
purposes." Id. at 6.
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There is a tendency in fish and wildlife management to
keep a harvest rate constant, often for political or economic
reasons.31 8 Given the uncertainty of scientific data and very
often the lack of information regarding the target population
and its supporting ecosystems, IUCN contends that "[u]se
levels must be conservative to minimize the negative effects
of miscalculation or unforeseen factors (such as disease, natu-
ral disasters, drought)."3 19 This is particularly true when
sustainable use is placed in an international commercial
trade context subject to outside market demands.3 20 The In-
ternational Wildlife Coalition points out that:
318. Rosenberg et al., supra note 314, at 828-29. Ludwig, also in reference to
fisheries, outlines the strong role that governments play in over-exploiting nat-
ural resources and the phenomenon he calls the "ratchet effect":
Harvesting of irregular or fluctuating resources is subject to a
ratchet effect: during relatively stable periods, harvesting rates
tend to stabilize at positions predicted by steady-state bioeconomic
theory. Such levels are often excessive. Then a sequence of good
years encourages additional investment in vessels of processing ca-
pacity. When conditions return to normal or below normal, the in-
dustry appeals to the government for help; often substantial
investments and many jobs are at stake. The governmental re-
sponse typically is direct or indirect subsidies. These may be
thought of initially as temporary, but their effect is to encourage
overharvesting. The rachet effect is caused by the lack of inhibition
on investments during good periods, but strong pressure not to dis-
invest during poor periods. The long-term outcome is a heavily sub-
sidized industry that overharvests the resource.
Ludwig et al., supra note 310, at 17.
319. IJCN/SSC Draft Sustainable Use Policy, supra note 14, at para. 41.
See also Ludwig et al., supra note 310, at 17. "Effective policies are possible
under conditions of uncertainty, but they must take uncertainty into account."
Id. at 36. This concept essentially reiterates the "precautionary principle" ex-
pressed by CITES, the Berne Criteria and IUCN's Draft Guidelines. See DRAFr
GUDELmEs, supra note 78, at para. 29.
320. See Orenstein, Revision of the Berne Criteria, supra note 36, at 5-6.
"Sustainable utilization" is most likely to be successful in cases
of local use of wildlife resources, in which both the producers and
consumers may be covered by a single management regime and for
which there may be long-standing cultural tradition that prevent or
limit over harvesting. It is less likely to be achieved when a species
is subject to the international trade with which CITES concerns it-
self, for which international levels of demand and market forces,




Even if a carefully-controlled regime of utilization can
be established in one or more areas, if international de-
mand remains high this demand is frequently met by Me-
gal trade. Any species for which illegal trade represents a
significant component of use cannot be said to be sustain-
ably utilized in any real sense.3 21
Sustainable use for consumptive commercial purposes re-
quires an elaborate infrastructure to oversee its implementa-
tion, its regulation, and the collection of reliable data on
species. Many developing countries where economic pres-
sures are high and funds are low lack such an infrastructure.
3. The Crocodilian Skin Trade: An Example of the
Challenges Confronting Commercial Sustainable
Use
The current use of crocodilians is often cited as an exam-
ple of successful sustainable use.3 22 However, it also illus-
trates some of the problems with its implementation. 323
a. Trade in "Classic" Crocodilians
The depletion of crocodilian species such as the salt
water crocodile is mainly attributable to the short term eco-
nomic interests of the leather industry.3 24 The crocodilian
skin trade reached its peak in the 1950's and early 1960's
when 5 to 10 million hides were traded annually world-
wide.3 25 Driven by high demand for their skins, many "clas-
sic" crocodilian species 326 were driven to near extinction:
321. Id.
322. Goldstein, supra note 69, at 999-1000.
323. The problem of CITES enforcement is not new and has been well docu-
mented. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 23; Kosloff and Trexler, supra note 24;
Jorgen B. Thomsen and Amie Brautigam, CITES in the European Economic
Community: Who Benefits? 5 B.U. IB'L L.J. 269 (1987); Eric McFadden, Asian
Compliance with CITES: Problems and Prospects, 5 B.U. Ibr'L L.J. 311 (1987).
324. McFadden, supra note 323, at 315 n.27.
325. THOREJARNARSON, ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 3.
326. These include the American alligator (Aligatoto mississippiensis) as
well as select crocodiles (Crocodylylus spp.) from Australia (C. porosus and C.
johnson), Papua, New Guinea (C. porsus and C. novaeguineae) and southern
Africa (C. niloticus). Ranching Stimulates Growth, supra note 112, at 1.
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"[tioday, of the 23 species of crocodilians, 17 have some or all
of their populations included on CITES Appendix j. " 327
As wild populations of classic crocodilians decreased, the
commercial tanning industry turned to the more plentiful but
less desirable caiman crocodilian skins from Latin
America.328 However, the classic crocodilian and the caiman
skin trades have developed differently. Protected by CITES
Appendix I status and aided by closely managed conservation
and ranching programs, many populations of classic
crocodilians (primarily in Australia, Papua, New Guinea,
Zimbabwe and the United States) began to rebound in the
late 1970's and early 1980's.329
The American alligator was removed from CITES Appen-
dix I in 1979 and commercial trade resumed.33 0 By the mid-
1980's a number of other classic crocodilian populations were
downlisted to Appendix II under the CITES ranching criteria
and quota system.331 Between 1984 and 1989, authorized
trading in classic crocodilian skins doubled to approximately
150,000.332 While illegal trade in classic skins does exist and
the Appendix I quota system is not without its problems,333
according to U.S. alligator consultant J. Don Ashley, illegal
trade in classic skins remains the exception rather than the
norm (less than five percent of the total trade).33 4
b. Trade in Latin American Caiman Crocodilians
In contrast, the caiman crocodilian trade continues to be
327. THORBJARNARSON, ACTION PLAN, supra note 70, at 3.
328. Id. "Caiman had not been previously utilized commercially because of
the presence of extensive dermal ossifications (osteoderms) in the ventral
scales, allowing the use of only a lateral flank of skin." Id.
329. Andrea L. Gaski and Ginette Hemley, The Ups and Downs of the Croco-
dilian Skin Trade, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Feb. 1988, at 5-6.
330. Ginette Hemley, Alligator Exports Boom in '86, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Feb.
1988, at 3.
331. Gaski and Hemley, supra note 329, at 6.
332. Ranching Stimulates Growth, supra note 112, at 1.
333. Gaski and Hemley, supra note 329, at 6. Indonesia continues to be the
focal point of illegal trade in classic crocodilians, particularly the salt water
crocodile. Id.
334. Telephone Interview with J. Don Ashley, Alligator and Crocodile Con-
sultant with Ashley and Associates (Nov. 18, 1992).
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plagued by illegal trade.8 35 Despite well established trade
laws336 and outright bans on trade in some species, caiman
skins, mostly exported illegally from Latin America, continue
to provide the majority of the world's 1.5 to 2 million commer-
cially traded skins.3 7 In Brazil, caiman skins continue to be
"routinely laundered"338 and other Latin American countries,
such as Bolivia and Paraguay, have been unable to control
their illegal caiman trade.3 39
Venezuela is perhaps the only Latin American country
with a viable caiman harvest program. Its efforts to imple-
ment a commercial sustainable use system illustrate the
335. Ranching Stimulates Growth, supra note 112, at 1.
336. Kathryn S. Fuller et al., Wildlife Trade Law Implementation in Develop-
ing Countries: The Experience in Latin America, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 290, 291
(1987). The article points out that failure to implement CITES is not a product
of weak laws:
Domestic legislation itself is seldom to blame; most countries ap-
pear to have adequate wildlife trade laws in place. For instance,
Bolivia, a major exporter in recent years of illicit caiman skins and
other wildlife items smuggled from neighboring countries, has had
a comprehensive wildlife law since 1986....
One major difficulty which Latin American countries face in
implementing wildlife trade laws arise because federal authorities
charged with enforcing controls often lack the political power, insti-
tutional stability, or popular support to muster adequate resources
for enforcement. . .. In addition, corruption among enforcement
officers can hinder national efforts to control trade.
Id. at 291-92 (citations omitted).
337. Peter Brazaitis, Trade in Crocodilian Hides and Products in the USA,
TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), June 1990, at 4. Peter Brazaitis, Head Curator of Animals
at the Central Park Zoo in New York City and a specialist on crocodilians, pro-
vides a very interesting account of legal and illegal trade in crocodilian skins:
Legal skins account for less than a quarter of the skins in trade
or about 360,000 skins from all species worldwide. In 1991, while
only 25,977 skins originated from commercial captive breeding
farms, 103,303 came from ranches drawing on wild populations and
229,887 were taken directly from wild populations. The remainder
of the 1.5 to 2,000,000 skins estimated in trade were contraband.
Peter Brazaitis and Mark Wise, Crocodilian Conservation Today: A Disection
19-20 (July 23, 1992) (unpublished policy report on file at the Pace Environmen-
tal Law Review).
338. Gaski and Hemley, supra note 329, at 14.
339. CITES prohibited Bolivia from trading internationally in the 1980's due
to repeated violations. Brazaitis and Wise, supra note 337, at 25; see also Fuller
et al., supra note 336. Illegal trade has also been cited in Colombia, Guatemala,
Guyana, and El Salvador. Gaski and Hemley, supra note 329, at 14-15.
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need for strong controls and accurate scientific data. In 1982,
Venezuela lifted its ten year ban on hunting caiman and in-
stituted a permit system which allowed harvesting of mostly
adult males.340 In its first year of existence, there was little
interest in the program and only 20,000 permits were distrib-
uted.341 Permit sales, however, jumped to around 70,000 in
the following year and by 1985 the demand for permits was
253,575.342
This quota was too high and turned out to be detrimental
to wild populations. 343 Therefore, in 1986, Venezuela's Min-
istry of the Environment (ProFauna) issued a one year ban on
crocodilian hunting to evaluate its program. 34 The program
resumed in 1987 with half the number of 1985 permits.3 45
This was still too high, and the number was nearly halved
again in 1988.346 The main problem was that the Ministry of
the Environment failed to effectively monitor the effect of
hunting on wild caiman populations.34 7
340. John B. Thorbjarnarson, An Analysis of the Spectacled Caiman Harvest
Program in Venezuela, in NEOTROPICAL WILDLIFE USE AND CONSERVATION 217,
224-25 (John G. Robinson & Kent H. Redford eds., 1991) [hereinafter
Thorbjarnarson, Caiman Harvest].
341. Id. at 224.
342. Id. at 225.
343. Id.
344. "[Slustainable exploitation cannot be achieved without first overexploit-
ing the resource." Ludwig et al., supra note 310, at 17, 36. Here as in many
instances, Venezuela, ran its permit system on a "wait and see" system. Id. at
36.
345. Thorbjarnarson, Caiman Harvest, supra note 340, at 225.
346. Oct. 29, 1992 Thorbjarnarson Interview, supra note 107. "Unfortu-
nately, wildlife authorities today are under such intensive pressure to deregu-
late species for utilization, they may base regulatory measures on cursory site
estimates of current populations, regardless of actual populations depletion and
vulnerability or the implications of pollution and adverse environmental
trends." Brazaitis and Wise, supra note 337, at 11.
347. Oct. 29, 1992 Thorbjarnarson Interview, supra note 107. There are
many differences among countries in establishing quotas:
[O]ne country may do little more than a cursory estimate of croco-
dilian populations, cite attacks on humans, and receive a harvest
quota, while another may develop a highly efficient and elaborate
system of population assessment and continual annual monitoring
under a well enforced program. Good examples of the latter are the
United States, Australia, Zimbabwe and South African crocodilian
programs.... Harvest quotas are most abusive to wild populations
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Another problem is that for each animal killed legally
under the permitted harvesting program there is approxi-
mately one animal killed illegally.34 8 In an effort to reduce
abuses and illegal bribes, the Venezuelan government insti-
tuted joint inspections conducted by members of its armed
services (Guardia Nacional) and one member of the Ministry
of the Environment. 349 Additionally, Venezuela requires
farmers to keep the caiman bones as proof that the animals
had been killed and skinned on the premises.350 To further
combat illegal trade, all skin sales must also go through a
central brokering agency.3 5 1
Today, Venezuela's crocodilian permit program has been
considerably reduced in size, approximately 20,000 to 30,000
permits are issued each year.352 The reduction has been
partly due to the drop in crocodilian skin prices in the world
market in the late 1980's and early 1990's and economic cri-
ses in Venezuela.353 At the March, 1993 CSG Steering Com-
mittee meetings in Darwin, Australia, it was noted that the
20 caiman ranches in Venezuela "were seriously overstocked
and having difficulty selling [their] products."3 54 The issue of
in the absence of a strong, established and effective law enforce-
ment presence. This is all too often the case in developing countries
and, in particular, those countries whose rural areas are dominated
by traffic in contraband. Lack of national wildlife law enforcement
capabilities result in animals being taken year round and stored
illegally for future sale. Undersized animals may be taken and
others may be lost to hunters after being wounded. Many skins
may deteriorate under hot tropical conditions in storage and are
not counted in the quota.
Brazaitis and Wise, supra note 337, at 24.
348. Illegal skins were reported to have been shipped into Venezuela from
Columbia and passed on as having been part of the harvesting program. Oct.
29, 1992 Thorbjarnarson Interview, supra note 107.
349. Id.
350. Id. One opportunist reportedly offered to rent crocodilian bones for in-
spections. Id.
351. Id.
352. Telephone interview with John Thorbjarnarson, Program Officer for
Latin America, The Wildlife Conservation Society, in Bronx, New York (Apr. 18,
1994).
353. Id. Alligator and crocodile skin prices dropped from $57 per foot in 1990
to $35 per foot. Brazaitis and Wise, supra note 337, at 25.
354. Crocodile Specialist Group, Steering Committee Minutes, 12-13 Mar.
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the economic viability of Venezuelan farms in general was
also raised.3 55
It was concluded that while caiman farming was economi-
caly viable under some circumstances, that a real danger
was the raising of unreal expectations in prospective
ranchers of any species. When farms and ranchers en-
counter economic difficulty there is strong temptation to
turn to wild stock to subsidize poor husbandry practice,
either by replacing lost animals or by illegal laundering of
wild skins. Effective enforcement is necessary to prevent
this.3 5 6
Downsizing the Venezuelan harvest program also had eco-
nomic impacts on government wildlife projects which derive
substantial income from permits issued.357 Some, however,
consider Venezuela's crocodilian permit program to be a suc-
cess. 358 The program has shown willingness to reduce permit
issues when signs of over-exploitation become evident359 and
has had relative success controlling its caiman crocodilian
harvesting program and preventing illegal trade from infil-
trating the system.
1993, CROCODILE SPECIALTST GROUP NEWSLETER (IUCN - World Conservation
Union, Species Survival Comm'n, Crocodile Specialist Group, Gainsville, Fla.),
Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 12 [hereinafter CSG Steering Comm. Mar. 1993 Minutes].
355. Id.
356. Id. In addition,
[ifarms may be the product of considerable financial investment,
and reflect relatively good levels of animal care, or, in some cases
may also become poorly operated consumers of wild populations.
There are no universally applied international standards of opera-
tion. Animals on some commercial farms and ranches in develop-
ing countries may experience up to 50 percent mortality from
disease, infection, and poor nutrition, in first year animals and 25
percent or more for incubating egg mortality.
Brazaitis and Wise, supra note 337, at 18.
357. CSG Steering Comm. Mar. 1993 Minutes, supra note 354, at 12.
358. Apr. 18, 1994 Thorbjarnarson Interview, supra note 352.
359. Fortunately, crocodilians are very resilient and have a tremendous abil-
ity to withstand considerable environmental pressures. However, this is not
the case for all species.
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B. Improving Trade Controls and Assuring Greater
Compliance with CITES: Prerequisites for
Sustainable Use
Given CITES' management problems and the inability
and, at times, the unwillingness of the Parties to enforce
CITES, it seems unlikely that sustainable use will soon suc-
ceed at an international level. The main problem with CITES
is not its "philosophy" but its "implementation."3 60 However,
some question any "incrementalist approach to CITES' imple-
mentation in which progress is measured by adding 'key'
missing parties, passing 'key' missing pieces of legislation,
and filling in 'key' loopholes."361 "'Incremental progress' ap-
pears unlikely to ever complete the regulatory framework re-
quired for treaty success."362
The Parties continue to address the many problems
360. TRAFFIC, Posrrv- LiSTING OF ANIMAlS (Draft Mar. 1991) at 13.
361. Mark C. Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: Political or Conservation Success? (Dec.
1989) at 130 (unpublished doctoral thesis at the Graduate School of Public Pol-
icy, University of California, Berkeley on file at the Pace Environmental Law
Review). Trexler's thesis is one of the most in depth studies evaluating the suc-
cesses and failures of CITES to date. A copy of Mr. Trexler's thesis can be ob-
tained by writing to him at Trexler & Associates, 1131 S.E. River Forest Road,
Oak Grove, Oregon 97267. A minimal fee for copying and postage is requested.
A brief summary of Mr Trexler's assessment of CITES follows:
There is, for example, no consensus on the nature and severity of
the problem posed by the wildlife trade.... Regulating the trade is
costly, and developed countries have not proven willing to absorb a
disproportionate share of the costs of CITES' implementation....
CITES' implementation has been chaotic and often counter-
productive from a species conservation perspective. The bottom
line is that although much has been learned about the trade, very
little is known about the relationships between trade flows and spe-
cies' status in the wild. There is no evidence that CITES has ended
the overexploitation of any species, and many species have been ad-
ded to Appendix I since CITES came into force. Species removed
from Appendix I had either been listed in error or were moved as a
result of political pressure rather than documented improvement in
their biological condition. It cannot even be assumed that CITES'
implementation has been at worst neutral with respect to the con-
servation status of any given species.
Id. at 98-99 (citations omitted).
362. Id. at 131.
1994] 385
85
386 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
which have plagued CITES since its inception.3 63 With the
assistance of funding from governments and NGOs, CITES
has conducted enforcement and training seminars. 364 In Ky-
oto, the Parties passed many resolutions seeking to improve
CITES' implementation.3 65 In an effort to stem illegal trade,
the Parties adopted a tagging system for live animals366 and
crocodile skins.367 It will probably take fifteen to twenty
years to effectively implement the new tagging system for
crocodiles and alligators.368 However, United States croco-
dile farmers are hopeful the system will substantially reduce
illegal trade as the prospect for expanding the market de-
pends on their ability to market products as legal, sustaina-
ble, non-endangered species. 369
363. Recommendations for improving CITES include: better trade controls,
greater inspection of goods, reduced bureaucracy, uniform identification and
marking systems, better record keeping, increased training of customs inspec-
tors, stiffer penalties and economic sanctions for violators, improved domestic
wildlife regulations, increased focus on consumer markets and "species for
which wildlife trade may pose a threat," greater assistance to developing coun-
tries in conducting biological studies, implementing CITES and in establishing
conservation and sustainable use programs. See generally Trexler, supra note
361, at 125-27; Hill, supra note 147, at 276.
364. Kosloff and Trexler, supra note 24, at 335-36.
365. See generally Trade With States Not Party to the Convention, CITES,
8th mtg., Conf. 8.8 (Kyoto, 1992); National Laws for the Implementation of the
Convention, CITES, 8th mtg., Conf 8.4 (Kyoto, 1992); Improving the Regulation
of Trade in Plants, CITES, 8th mtg., Conf. 8.17 (Kyoto, 1992); Implementation
of the Convention in the European Economic Community (EEC), CITES, 8th
mtg., Conf. 8.2 (Kyoto, 1992). Other resolutions adopted by the Parties in-
cluded The Trade in Wild-Caught Animal Specimens, CITES, 8th mtg., Conf.
8.9 (Kyoto, 1992) and Trade in Live Birds Experiencing High Mortalities in
Transport, CITES, 8th mtg., Conf. 8.12 (Kyoto, 1992) (cited in Eighth Meeting of
CITES, supra note 121, at 6, 7, 9).
366. Use of Coded-Microchip Implants for Marking Live Animals in Trade,
CITES, 8th mtg., Conf. 8.13 (Kyoto, 1992) (cited in Eighth Meeting of CITES,
supra note 121, at 10).
367. Universal Tagging System for the Identification of Crocodilian Skins,
CITES, 8th mtg., Conf. 8.14 (Kyoto, 1992).
368. According to Ashley, this is not a long time considering the extent of the
problem of illegal trade in the present system (one to two million skins per
year). Nov. 18, 1992 Ashley Interview, supra note 334.
369. Id. The 1950's and 1960's marked the peak of the classic skin trade
with a market of about 500,000 classic skins. In 1970, the figure dropped to
about 300,000 skins. Id. At present, the number of classic skins on the world
market remains at about 300,000. Id. Currently, nearly seventy percent of the
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Although recent efforts to improve CITES' implementa-
tion are laudable, two fundamental problems inhibit CITES'
success. The first problem is the lack of resources presently
being devoted to inspections and controls by industrialized
nations at their borders. If Parties such as the United States
continue to inspect only twenty-five percent of all imports of
fauna and flora into their countries, little change can be ex-
pected in the fight against illegal trade and the ability of
CITES to effectively monitor and ensure sustainable use.3 70
In addition, enforcement must be given greater impor-
tance within CITES' framework. The CITES Animals and
Plants Committee has proposed that a separate Law Enforce-
ment Network be formed, consisting of officers from different
countries nominated by the Parties.3 71 Such a Committee
would be an important first step in increasing cooperation
among the Parties in the area of enforcement and in assuring
that the Parties that fail to comply with the CITES' provi-
sions are exposed. "In the final analysis, the only truly effec-
tive enforcement techniques are the use of public pressure
classic skins' raw and finished products go to Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Korea and Japan. Id. Part of the decline in demand for alligator products is
attributed to an increase in environmental awareness worldwide and the belief
that the crocodile is still endangered or illegal. Id. In order for ranching pro-
grams in the United States to remain successful, says Ashley, the American
market must expand. Id.
370. Telephone interview with Jerome S. Smith, Chief, International Affairs,
United States Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Divi-
sion of Law Enforcement (Apr. 19, 1994). According to one expert, the United
States government would have to hire an additional 113 special agents and 340
wildlife inspectors at a cost of $31 million to achieve 100 percent inspection of
all wildlife entering the country. Statement of Dr. Allen Rutberg, Senior Scien-
tist for Wildlife and Habitat Protection, the Humane Society of the United
States, before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Inte-
rior and Related Agencies, on Mar. 1, 1994 (unpublished Humane Services doc-
ument on file at the Pace Environmental Law Review). In comparison to other
countries, the United States' twenty-five percent inspection rate may be high
but to fully implement the Convention, it must be higher.
371. Proposal to form a Law Enforcement Network, CITES Standing Comm.,
31st mtg., Doc. SC.31.13 (Geneva, March, 1994). Unfortunately only nine par-
ties responded to the proposal, and the Secretariat's response was not support-
ive. Id. Uruguay contended that the Secretariat already performs the tasks
that the proposed Network seeks to do. Id. But a closer look at the facts shows
that not to be the case.
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and higher proffle legal action by conservation groups."3 72
The second factor hindering improvements in CITES effi-
ciency pertains to funding. At the Second Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, a trust fund to be managed by the
United Nations Environmental Program was established.37 3
Monies for the fund come from the Parties and are based on
the United Nations scale.374 The Secretariat has struggled to
compel the Parties to pay their dues.3 7 5 Unlike the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, which has a funding mechanism
designed to assist Parties in implementing sustainable use
projects at the national level,376 CITES' trust fund only cov-
ers CITES administrative operations. Each year the CITES
Secretariat is forced to rely on outside funds for its special
372. Hill, supra note 147, at 274.
373. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 290-91; Trexler, supra
note 361, at 142-43. Favre provides some background information on the issue:
The Secretariat has neither a product to sell nor a tax author-
ity which allows a firm base of income upon which he can depend.
Words of support for the goals of CITES are easily given. The sign-
ing of the checks to transfer funds has not been so readily accom-
plished. In the beginning the IUCN and the UNEP provided the
start up cost of CITES, but fairly quickly it became obvious that the
Parties must bear the ultimate responsibility for the raising of
funds to support the Treaty (see Conf. 2.1). Over the years there
has been a considerable amount of discussion about the obtaining
and spending of money at the meetings of the Conference of the
Parties.
FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 289.
374. FAvlE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 291. In 1979, the Par-
ties amended CITES to allow the Parties to be able to make such provisions as
may be necessary to enable the Secretariat to carry out its duties, "and adopt
financial provisions." Id. at 292; CITES, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 3(a).
375. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 292.
376. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on
the Environment, arts. 20, 21, 31, opened for signature June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc.
DPI/1307, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992). The United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity, signed at the Earth Summit in Brazil in 1992, seeks to
integrate the "conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity." Id. art.
6. CITES also acknowledges 'that substantial investments are required to con-
serve biological diversity and that there is the expectation of a broad range of
environmental, economic and social benefits from those investments." Id. pmbl.
The temporary funding mechanism, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
operates under the auspices of the World Bank, United Nations Development




Outside funding for projects such as surveys, training
sessions, publications and the like has consistently fallen
short of meeting CITES' needs.3 78 Left out of the equation
are developing countries' needs for technical and administra-
tive assistance in CITES' implementation as well as financial
assistance.37 9 Instituting sustainable development projects
also requires funding. However, "there is no way to impose a
tax and collect it against [a Party's] wi11."38o Parties must
unilaterally consider tax initiatives on flora and fauna to
compel users to pay their share of the world's conservation
costs. This idea is not new.38 ' In 1991, a report on sustaina-
ble use prepared by the Joint Nature Conservation Commit-
tee recommended that "the government consider[]
mechanisms such as import taxes or charges for license appli-
cations whereby wildlife traders could contribute financially
377. FAvRE, INTERNATiONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 292-94. Favre writes:
"[sipecial project funding is critical to the success of CITES as that is how much
of the needed information is generated." Id. at 294.
378. Id. at 289. Favre points out that:
The lack of money has always acted as a significant constraint
on the operations of the Secretariat. The seeking of funding un-
doubtably consumes a measurable portion of the time and re-
sources of the Secretariat. Millions of dollars are spent around the
world every year on CITES activities, yet millions more could easily
be consumed in increased activities of scientific research, manage-
ment, data analysis and enforcement efforts.
Id.
379. The need for financial independence is another argument in favor of
commercial sustainable use of fauna and flora.
The desire of countries to exploit their wildlife resources under the
CITES umbrella could be used to provide needed resources and ex-
pertise to undertake ranching and sustained exploitation-for-export
programs in native habitats, with the incentives they would bring
for habitat conservation and even the creation of protected areas.
Trexler, supra note 361, at 126. He criticizes the bureaucracy of CITES, claim-
ing that millions of dollars are spent by governments in implementing CITES
and by wildlife industry in "paperwork and opportunity costs." Id. at 102.
380. FAvPE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 35, at 292.
381. See Hill, supra note 147, at 277. For example, a tax on the $600 million
a year U.S. importation of wildlife or the annual $5 billion world trade could
raise significant funds. Id.
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towards investigating the impact of trade."38 2
The need for consumers to contribute to conservation ef-
forts is now more urgent than ever. Governments are finan-
cially strapped, and it is becoming increasingly difficult
politically to allocate funds for overseas conservation and de-
velopment projects when the monies are also desperately
needed at home. Politics and logistics obstruct new tax pro-
posals. Wildlife trade groups have strong lobbies. The inter-
national trend toward the lowering of tariffs in the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is another obsta-
cle.38 3 Countries also have an interest in protecting their
own industries dependent on wildlife. The issue needs to be
explored. Until sufficient funds are raised to effectively assist
the Secretariat and the Parties in implementing CITES, it
will fail to live up to its goal.
VII. Conclusion
The picture for many wildlife species is bleak.38 4 New
measures must be taken to preserve the world's fauna and
flora. Though CITES is important to this preservation, it is
also only one piece of a much larger puzzle and must be
viewed for what it is: a limited treaty designed to ensure that
international trade of fauna and flora is not detrimental to
the survival of a species. CITES recognizes that interna-
tional trade in flora and fauna is inevitable and must be con-
trolled. Such controls ideally seek to ensure that the
international trade in species occurs in a sustainable man-
382. JonTs NATURE CONSERVATION COMM EE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
WILDLIFE: A REVIEW OF SUSTAiNABLE USE 4 (1991).
383. See generally CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIROm NT: CoNFurs AND OPPORTUNrrms (1992);
Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Pri-
mer, 15 HASTINGS Comm. & ENT. L.J. 535 (Summer 1992); John H. Jackson,
World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (Fall 1992).
384. In 1989, Trexler predicted that "incremental progress in CITES' geo-
graphic coverage, implementation legislation, and identification techniques will
likely continue to be overwhelmed by weaknesses in its regulatory structure,
growth of the wildlife trade, changing international trade patterns, difficulties
in maintaining CITES' momentum, and implementation difficulties of the Par-
ties' own making." Trexler, supra note 361, at 128.
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ner.38 5 However, the ultimate purpose of CITES is not to pro-
mote trade even if such trade is sustainable; to do so would
violate CITES' stated neutrality toward placing a value on
flora and fauna.38 6
The sustainable use debate will undoubtedly continue.
Although the Parties at Kyoto recognized that commercial in-
ternational trade could be beneficial to a species if conducted
in a sustainable manner, they acknowledged numerous other
values as well and the potentially detrimentally impact that
international trade might have on a species' survival.
At the Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (to
be held in Florida in November 1994), the Parties will debate
the benefits of new proposed listing criteria. While there is
an understandable desire to employ listing criteria which are
as biologically sound as possible, care must be taken to avoid
overvaluation of scientific studies. Scientific conclusions are
only as good as the data used and science is not foolproof.
CITES must remain true to its founding principle: to
continue to seek ways of assuring that international trade of
flora and fauna does not endanger a species nor disrupt a spe-
cies' role in the ecosystem. The Parties must make a greater
commitment to conservation, both financially and politically.
The delegate from Botswana stated during the debate over
the downlisting of the African elephant that "CITES has been
reluctant to examine the flaws in its own systems that have
encouraged illegal trade."3 8 7 "What is needed is a system
with sufficient controls to allow sustainable utilization with-
out benefitting illegal traders and poachers, and without un-
wittingly destroying the very environment which we purport
to protect."388 Ultimately, the greatest overriding factor af-
385. CITES "is both a conservation and trade instrument. Although its pri-
mary goal is to preserve endangered species, its secondary goal is to allow a
sustainable level of exploitation of those species." Hill, supra note 147, at 245.
He notes that CITES' main theoretical weakness is a result of these competing
interests which "attempt[ I] to balance the vague intuitive notion that the pres-
ervation of species is good, against commercial demands for its exploitation."
Id. at 246.
386. See CITES, supra note 1, pmbl.
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fecting the success of sustainable use in an international
trade context will be the ability of the Parties to effectively
implement and enforce CITES' provisions. Time will tell if
international cooperation will effectively stem the tide.
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